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Summary
The European Union is gearing itself up to incorporate a number of Central and Eastern
European countries (CEECs) over the next few years. This process, known as “Eastern
enlargement,” has no precedent. As the EU invites in and incorporates former commu-
nist-planned economies now undergoing transitions to market economies, its character
inevitably will change.
By the start of the next decade, the EU likely will have grown from its current fifteen
members to between twenty-five and twenty-seven member countries. Its geographic
area will increase substantially, and its population is expected to jump from the current
324 million to close to 500 million citizens. In addition, the new and enlarged Union
will emerge as a much more heterogeneous confederation of European states and will
cease to appear as a “rich-man’s club.”
Through the incorporating of up to twelve lower-income countries, the EU’s per cap-
ita income will fall and, at least over the medium term, will continue to exhibit a lower
per capita GDP than its current levels. Though the EU will appear statistically poorer
through its decline in per capita GDP, the value of its final goods and services will be
even greater than that of the United States. In numerous economic categories the en-
larged EU will parallel and in some cases overtake the U.S. as the world’s largest eco-
nomic unit.
In this working paper, challenges associated with bringing into the EU the former
planned economies are contrasted with what the Union faced in previous decades by
taking in Ireland in the 1970s and the Southern countries Greece, Spain and Portugal in
the 1980s. In addition, the likely patterns of accession of individual countries and groups
of countries are speculated about at length. Although European Commission and single
member states deny it, much room is left for a political decision over the concrete en-
largement scenario. At the beginning of 2002, a “Big Bang” enlargement involving all
candidates apart from Bulgaria and Romania, and planned for the end of 2004 or begin-
ning of 2005, seemed to be most likely. However, as we describe below, this scenario
involves serious risks.
Eastern enlargement is expected to create both growth and welfare effects that will be
shared disproportionately between the current EU members and the accession countries
joining the Union as part of Eastern enlargement. Within the EU-15, member countries
will experience an asymmetry in the distribution of costs and benefits, an asymmetry
that should alter the bargaining structure and power play that seem to have solidified
among EU member states since Southern enlargement in the 1980s. It seems fair to
forecast that the accession countries will benefit across the board, and that each can ex-
pect significant increases in GDP output that should continue over the long run as part
of their “catching up.”Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240 vi
States with close geographic proximity to the CEECs, particularly Germany, Austria
and Italy, are expected to benefit more than their EU-15 counterparts from increased
economic opportunities associated with helping the former communist economies rise
toward the average EU level. Those countries that have been beneficiaries of generous
structural funds—such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece—can expect to suffer
declines in current funding levels as portions of their funds are earmarked to foster
growth in the newly entering CEECs. More prosperous members, such as Germany,
Austria, the Netherlands and France, also can expect to experience losses in financial
redistribution—at least declines in the current levels of their incoming transfers of
structural and agricultural funds. Because old member states benefited over decades
from an entrenched allocation system, accession countries deserve the opportunity to
utilize these reallocated funds to facilitate their cohesive growth as they move toward
becoming bona fide EU members.
The CEECs undoubtedly will benefit from a succession of EU fund transfers in-
tended to promote their convergence with the average per capita GDP of the Western
EU members. As a result of these transfers, the CEECs can expect one-time jumps in
their GDPs of approximately four percent. This annual infusion of EU funds, along with
the greater political stability of the whole region, will help these countries attain addi-
tional growth and welfare effects over the long term. The CEECs will also benefit from
specific effects associated with integration. Most importantly, the current EU with its
vast markets and hundreds of millions of consumers with comparatively high incomes
will serve as a gigantic economic space both for selling CEEC products and for import-
ing EU investment and consumer goods. Overall integration effects for the CEECs
might exceed eight percent of their GDPs (steady-state effect).
All things considered, Eastern enlargement is not expected to cause any dramatic
economic shock or induce any sort of financial crises, either to the CEECs or to the ex-
isting EU members. The reason is that Eastern enlargement in fact has been underway
since the start of the 1990s, when the CEECs opened their economies to freer trade
practices and to inflows of foreign direct investments (FDI). Hence, most of the welfare
effects have already been absorbed, and the awaited effects on the distribution of in-
comes and adjustments in labor markets will be ameliorated by labor migration. CEEC
integration portends that—over time—labor will move more freely and thereby be allo-
cated more efficiently, and with beneficial results. Additional welfare effects are also
expected as real trade costs decline and the risk premiums for investments in CEECs are
reduced.
Still, we are aware that—at present—the EU is not in a financial and institutional po-
sition to cope with the full range of challenges looming on the enlargement horizon.
Neither the reform steps taken under Agenda 2000, nor the ones agreed upon at the Nice
Summit in December of 2000, suffice to make the Union fit for Eastern enlargement. An
important step forward could be made at the intergovernmental conference (IGC) al-
ready planned for 2004. This conference should address the core problems and deter-Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement vii
mine the basic competencies,
1 constitutional issues and decision-making procedures of
the EU. In fact, it should proceed to revise the Nice Treaty.
Nevertheless, we expect that details in major policy areas will have to be negotiated
later within the framework of a new Agenda 2007. The negotiations on this agenda
likely will begin in 2005 and should be finished the following year. If the IGC 2004 fails
to introduce major reforms in EU institutions—reforms that should lead to more effi-
cient, transparent and legitimate decision making—Agenda 2007 should complete the
process. We expect and hope that Agenda 2007 would serve as a major breakthrough for
the future of a United Europe.
Above all, Agenda 2007 must address the disproportionate spending to support the
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as well as the various spending programs
falling under the rubric of “structural funds.” Over recent decades the comparatively rich
Western European countries readily and easily carried the levels of entitlements sup-
porting the relatively few low-income countries in Western Europe.  This constellation
is about to undergo profound changes, with challenges that should not be underesti-
mated. For the EU to remain financially fit for the future, limits have to be set on enti-
tlements. In  addition, we suggest that the EU’s cohesion policy should shift from the
present support of less-developed regions to the promotion of economic convergence
among countries. This requires a more sensible reallocation of funds, as well as real
increases in revenues to cover the EU’s growing expenditures.
We propose reforms to the EU’s structural policy
2 that would offer member states
greater control over choices of investment projects. We recommend that the EU con-
centrate spending on fewer objectives, and that these spending objectives should be tar-
geted to assist poorer member states upon their accession to the Union. A clearer and
more transparent mechanism for financial redistribution will be necessary to avoid end-
less political horse-trading of transfer payments. We propose a financial redistribution
scheme in which the contribution to the budget of each single member state is based on
that state’s contribution to the EU’s GDP and the financial transfers on the relative wel-
fare measured in per-capita GDP (purchasing-power standards).
3
Step by step, agricultural-policy reforms should focus on further price liberalization,
increased national cofinancing, reduction in direct-income supports and dismantling the
latter from the means of production (land and animals). In the end, the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) should be abolished in its existing form and the task of the Euro-
pean Commission limited to ensuring fair competition while setting the general guide-
                                                
1 “Competence” and its plural form “competencies” refer to the tasks, responsibilities and decision-
making power of the different levels of administrative, organizational and institutional structures of the
European Union. One speaks of the competencies of the various regions, the nation states, the EU Com-
mission, the European Council and the European Parliament.
2 The EU’s structural policy is sometimes also referred to as a „cohesion policy.“ Its policy instru-
ments include the use of cohesion funds, structural funds and funds to support social and rural policy.
3 Eurostat uses the term „purchasing-power standards,“ which is nearly identical to the widely used
„purchasing-power parity.“ Both concepts measure the real income of people in countries based on their
purchasing power.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240 viii
lines for national income-support measures. As a result of such changes, European pol-
icy and institutions could concentrate on those areas that only the European Union can
handle properly (single market and security issues).
Eastern enlargement will also create major challenges for the European Monetary
Union (EMU). The accession countries will not be offered the possibility to opt out of
the monetary union—as did Denmark and Britain. However, we argue that for CEECs
still in the throes of a catching-up process, approaching the Maastricht criteria (espe-
cially the inflation target) too rapidly likely would restrain economic growth and crucial
structural adjustments. Instead, approaching these objectives with a medium- or long-
term perspective will foster economic growth. Any unilateral introduction of the euro by
a CEEC—as promoted by some economists—would be, in fact, a violation of the spirit
of the accession treaties and harmful for larger accession countries.
For the CEECs, joining the EU will mean that they must also become bona fide
members of the EMU—and permanently remain in it, abiding by its rules and restric-
tions. As the EU enlarges, the European Central Bank (ECB) will find its position in-
creasingly pivotal. The euro region will grow substantially bigger as more countries join
the European Monetary Union (EMU). In addition, the ECB will be faced with several
problems. First, it seems highly unlikely that efficient decision making will be possible
with twenty-seven members within the ECB council. Second, as economic conditions
within the euro zone become more diversified, a consistent monetary policy will be
harder to achieve. If monetary policy is directed toward the major European econo-
mies—as it should be—the catching-up economies in the East might be confronted with
higher inflation rates. If the ECB wishes to control inflation in the economies on the
Eastern periphery, it would have to introduce a more restrictive stance in monetary pol-
icy. This, in turn, would affect overall economic growth in the euro zone. Therefore, we
believe that it is in the best interests of all parties that a CEEC not enter into the EU and
the EMU prematurely, as its national autonomy over monetary and fiscal policy would
be lost to a centralized monetary authority—the ECB.
We offer a package of reforms for the EU to consider—reforms that would alter and
change the Union’s institutions so that it can deal successfully with the “leftovers” from
Nice. We suggest that the powers and competencies of different levels of governance be
defined more precisely, and that these policy measures be undertaken at the already-
planned intergovernmental conference (IGC) scheduled for 2004. The processes of EU
decision making need to be streamlined further and rendered more transparent, demo-
cratic and effective. In the long run it will be necessary to reconstitute the EU as a
uniquely styled union of European states. This union should be more than a confedera-
tion yet more loosely allied than a classical federal state, such as the United States of
America. We think that when this institution achieves its final form of organizational
development it will be described as a “Federation of European States.”Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement 1
I. Introduction
When the Cold War ended more than a decade ago, leaders in both Eastern and Western
Europe spoke euphorically. At that time it was fashionable to proclaim openly for the
long-hoped-for dream: the political and economic unification of Europe. Today Europe-
ans are faced with actually making their sanguine vision—expressed clearly in the 1957
Treaty of Rome—a reality. However, an array of formidable challenges has emerged as
European states attempt to bridge their East-West divide. Both the West European states
represented by the European Union (EU) and the Central and East European countries
(CEECs) seeking accession still have to complete a wide range of demanding tasks to
make their dream come true.
We have chosen 2007 as the year for which the EU needs to prepare. Current struc-
tures and budget plans are set to last more or less in their established forms through the
end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2006. As currently constituted, the EU will be able to cope with
financing a first accession round that could include possibly as many as ten countries
before the end of 2006. However, come 2007, the EU in its present form will not be
prepared financially to cope with the additional demands and challenges arising from
Eastern enlargement.
Never over the long span of history has Europe been unified on such a large geo-
graphic scale as it would be under the proposed scheme. Unifying Europe at the start of
the twenty-first century involves the EU inviting in selected countries that spent four
decades behind the Iron Curtain. This process, known as “Eastern enlargement,” por-
tends a substantial increase in the EU’s geographic size and population. Shortly after
this decade’s end, the EU is expected to have increased from the existing fifteen mem-
ber countries to include as many as twenty-seven. The EU’s population is expected to
increase from its current 324 million to close to 500 million. Clearly, such an enlarge-
ment is without precedent. What helps complicate matters is that along with preparing
for accession the CEEC candidates are also undertaking transitions from planned to
market economies.
Might Western Europe threaten its own hard-earned prosperity by extending its reach
too far eastward? Do benefits expected from enlargement outweigh anticipated costs?
Why is it that the EU public expresses so much skepticism over the issue of enlarge-
ment? Does Europe’s public perceive real dangers associated with Eastern enlargement
that the EU elites fail—or refuse—to recognize?
There are other important questions to be addressed as well. Might the CEECs
quickly erode their already-weak production capacities when they come head-to-head
too suddenly with the more advanced service, manufacturing industries and highly pro-
ductive farms of Western Europe? Should the EU’s Eastern enlargement be seen as a
euphemism for a new form of colonialism—a solution quickly pieced together to fill the
security vacuum left by the collapsed Soviet occupation? Will Brussels become the
headquarters for the staging of a new East European debacle, where it and other Western2 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
European capitals grow ever richer as the CEECs remain relatively poor? These are the
sorts of questions that we take to heart and attempt honestly and accurately to address in
this working paper.
The approach we take to the subject of Eastern enlargement is influenced by our
long-standing concern for the millions of Central and East Europeans whom we judge to
have suffered disproportionate hardships during World War Two and the ensuing Cold
War. Over more than four decades following the Second World War, traditions that
provided the foundations of modern civil society in Western Europe were confronted,
challenged and thwarted at multiple levels and sometimes in the most primitive of ways
in the CEECs.
As economists, we find particularly disturbing the fact that under the CEECs’ Soviet-
type planned economies, the populations suffered numerous disadvantages from a sys-
tem with built-in tendencies for institutional sclerosis. The “information revolution” that
started to play such an important role in the 1970s in advanced Western economies
could hardly take root and play a role in planned economies where information was
deemed a dangerous threat to state control.
While the CEECs stagnated during the Cold War, Western Europe forged ahead. It
made great advances in modernizing its economies, with benefits that were widely
shared.  Even the Union’s late entrants and more relatively backward economies such as
Ireland’s, Spain’s and Portugal’s made substantial progress toward catching up with the
EU average.
We acknowledge that Europeans—both Eastern and Western—do indeed face formi-
dable challenges from such an unprecedented enlargement. However, the rich legacy of
economic knowledge stands clearly on the side of enlargement. In this paper we shall
present our research results and muster all the scientific and empirical resources at our
disposal to attempt to demonstrate that current members of the EU do indeed stand to
win through an Eastern enlargement. But the Eastern countries stand to win in a bigger
way.Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement 3
II. Forging Europe’s Unity
1. Challenges of Enlargement
For a full decade, the Central and East European countries (CEECs) have undergone
transitions. At separate speeds, each has moved from authoritarian, one-party rule to
parliamentary democracy and from a planned to a market economy. Some countries are
ahead of others. The most advanced reform countries, such as Hungary and Slovenia,
have nearly completed their economic transition and are mostly prepared for their acces-
sion to the EU, given the full range of criteria they have to meet. Other countries remain
farther behind.
The European Commission provides criteria for judging a CEEC’s preparation for
EU accession. On an annual basis, candidate countries are evaluated by the EU Com-
mission based in Brussels to determine how well each has fulfilled its moves toward
democracy and a competitive market economy, following the "Copenhagen Criteria"
(European Commission, 2000 and 2001). Likewise, candidate countries are evaluated to
see how well they have implemented the Acquis Communautaire, the common set of
rules and laws adopted by all EU members (Krenzler, 1998). While some of the CEECs
appear close to fulfilling criteria for accession, others remain quite far behind. Those
countries furthest along likely will be among the first round of entrants—envisaged to
be brought into the EU in 2004 or 2005. Those lagging behind cling to the hope of en-
tering in a second or third round in 2008 or 2010.
4
What makes the EU’s Eastern enlargement so challenging as an economic undertak-
ing?  We think that the challenges are related to the unprecedented scale of the antici-
pated expansion, combined with the fact that vast differences exist in the levels of eco-
nomic development and performance between the prospective CEECs and the advanced
members of the EU. Comparative levels of capital endowment and technical develop-
ment are indeed greater than they were between Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece and
the Economic Community members at the time of Southern enlargement in the 1970s
and ’80s. Ireland’s and Spain’s per capita GDPs were roughly sixty percent of the EU’s,
while Greece’s was fifty percent and Portugal’s thirty.
When measured at current exchange rates, the average level of per capita output in
ten of the CEECs considered is but sixteen percent of the EU average (see Column Two
of Table 1). More advanced CEECs such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary
                                                
4 Which countries will enter in a first round is not completely settled.  All indicators suggest that those
countries furthest along with fulfilling the economic criteria specified in the Acquis Communautaire will
enter first. However, political and security concerns are also a factor. Even geographic considerations
inadvertently shape the pattern of Eastern enlargement. Within the EU, member countries promote en-
largement with varying degrees of enthusiasm. According to a plebiscite conducted in June of 2001, the
Irish publicly voiced the greatest skepticism regarding Eastern enlargement, while Germany and Sweden
have lobbied most earnestly for an early enlargement with a large group of entrants.4 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
reach levels of between eighteen and twenty percent of the EU average. Slovenia regis-
ters at forty-four percent of the average EU per capita GDP. Although the Czech Re-
public, Slovenia and Hungary reach levels of purchasing-power standards (PPS) equal
to—and in some cases greater—than the fifty-five and seventy percent of the EU aver-
age attained by Southern countries at the time of their accessions, the ten CEECs regis-
ter at about forty percent of the EU average (see Column Three of Table 1). With such
comparatively poor economies, the CEECs face trying to enter an EU that has raised its
standards for entry.
TABLE 1
Indicators of Levels of Socioeconomic Development:





























Bulgaria 8.2 1600 5400 25 26.6 14.5 57
Czech Rep. 10.3 5400 13500 62 5.1 3.9 33
Estonia 1.4 3800 8500 39 7.4 6.3 44
Hungary 10.1 4900 11700 54 6.5 4.8 36
Latvia 2.4 3300 6600 30 13.5 4.5 50
Lithuania 3.7 3300 6600 30 18.0 7.6 47
Poland 38.6 4400 8700 40 18.8 3.3 38
Romania 22.4 1800 6000 27 42.8 12.6 58
Slovak
Rep.
5.4 3900 10800 47 6.7 4.5 35
Slovenia 2.0 9800 16100 74 9.9 3.2 29
CEEC-10 104.7 3800 8700 40 – 6.5
5 43
Portugal 9.9 10600 16100 76 12.6 3.9
6 28
Spain 39.4 14200 17300 82 7.4 4.2
6 21





27.8 17 40 – – 29.8 (15)
7
1 Human Development Index (HDI) for 1999; EU-15 for 1999. 
2 PPS, purchasing-power standards, is
calculated in current euros. 
3 HDI ranking is based on a synthetic measure of eight socioeconomic vari-
ables, a lower number indicating a better ranking position. 
4 EU-15. 
5 Unweighted average. 
6 Share in
value added in 1998. 
7 Average HDI-ranking position of EU-15.
Sources: statistics of Eurostat; Human Development Report, UNDP, New York, 2001; Osteuropa-Institut
München, Working Paper No. 227, 2000Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement 5
In fact, economic preconditions for accession and then full Union participation are
now higher than they were in the 1970s or 1980s when the countries with lower per
capita incomes entered. Brussels introduced additional steps for integration in the 1990s,
such as the Single Market Program and the European Monetary Union (EMU). Follow-
ing accession, countries applying to join and remain members of the EMU prudently
must bring into and keep in line rates of inflation, federal budget deficits and the ratio
between total public-sector debt and total output of final goods and services (GDP).
Were this not enough, EU membership also means integrating into—and then surviving
in—a single, European-wide market for consumer goods as well as factors of produc-
tion.  Integration has to be achieved in an economic environment in which, even over
the long run, levels of labor productivity among members countries will vary signifi-
cantly. In sum, rising standards make EU accession that much more difficult and costly
when compared to earlier accessions in previous decades.
At the same time, the EU institutions, policies and legal framework could be charac-
terized as “moving targets” for the accession countries. The EU is faced with undertak-
ing additional major reforms, which means that the currently established goals and
benchmarks the CEECs have to reach on their accession road likely will be raised and
thus made even more difficult to achieve. As CEEC entry criteria are raised to ever
higher levels, ever greater financial burdens will be placed on the CEECs as they at-
tempt to achieve them. What is more, we expect a growing asymmetry to emerge—a
growing differentiation between the costs to CEECs for implementing EU regulations
and the benefits new members are likely to receive and realize as EU transfer payments
taking the form of agricultural and structural funds. In sum, since EU membership has
numerous explicit and implicit costs, preparation for membership can be seen as carry-
ing risks that are without historical precedent.
2. Processes Leading Up to Accession
Eastern enlargement can be understood as a historical response to an opportunity to
bring all Europeans finally into the fold and under the institutional wings of the EU.
What is important to keep in mind is that the EU’s Eastern enlargement involves more
than having the CEECs join the European Union. The “return to Europe” is the result of
a long and drawn-out process. It could be argued that it started with the periodic resis-
tance to Soviet domination that manifested itself in numerous ways, including violent
revolts that resulted in the deaths of many thousands of heroic citizens. However, even
the most generously funded intelligence organizations failed to perceive that the Cold
War ever would end. And only a few thinkers at the margins of intellectual life ever
speculated that the Soviet Union willfully would throw in the towel and undergo an in-
ternally directed self-liquidation from the top down. Prospects for Eastern enlargement
greatly improved when the Soviet Union lost its vast sphere of influence in Europe.  In
this section we present a short history of Eastern enlargement from the time when it
began to accelerate at the end of the Cold War.6 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
In our view, Eastern enlargement developed from a process of integration that has
been achieved by policies drawn up and implemented incrementally over the last decade
(see Table 2). Accession is but the final step in a multistep process toward enlargement.
And when accession is completed, policymakers likely will discover an array of short-
comings in the EU that fetter the successful integration of a Pan-European economy.
These institutional shortcomings will have to be met head on with reform policies.
TABLE 2
Steps Toward EU Enlargement






Europe Agreements Signed December 1991;
trade policies implemented
since beginning of 1992
Trade and political dialogue; concrete
support of the enlargement process




December 1993 Criteria for enlargement (market econ-
omy and ability to cope with EU com-
petition)
Essen Council Meeting December 1994 Decision on the “preaccession strat-
egy”




December 1995 Important advances on the road to
accession, provided by several initia-
tives
Agenda 2000 Berlin Intergovernmental
Council (IGC) in 1999
Preconditions on the EU side for en-
largement, such as reforms in struc-
tural and agricultural policy, as well as
access to  financial resources
Negotiations for en-
largement
Since 2000 (ongoing) Establishing the Acquis Com-
munautaire (EU laws and regulations
in the accession countries)
Nice Summit December 2000 Reforms in the EU institutions and
voting powers
Source: synopsis derived from Mayhew (1998)Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement 7
A precursor to the start of the CEECs’ integration into the EU took place toward the
end of 1989 when the then European Community considered offering associate status to
the newly forming democracies to their east (Mayhew, 1998, p. 21). However, the kick
that truly started the enlargement ball rolling was made in 1990, when the EU offered a
Provisional Trade Agreement that gave the CEECs preferential trade access to EU mar-
kets. Offering trade access was the EU’s response to the economic crises facing the
CEECs when the ruble lost its convertibility in COMECON, the Eastern bloc’s market.
Then the vast Soviet market suffered a collapse in demand, and a major slump in CEEC
exports ensued.
The EU helped to restore CEEC trade flows, to a degree, while also promoting the
start of an important change in the composition of CEEC output and instilling in the
CEEC countries an appreciation of product quality. Offering trade access assisted the
CEECs in better mitigating the transition recession of the early 1990s that was directly
related to the breakup of COMECON trade and the collapse of the Soviet Union’s giant
economy.
These agreements between the EU and the CEECs were further developed and insti-
tutionalized at the end of 1991, around the same time that the Soviet Union dissolved
itself.  Taking the form of “Association Agreements” based on Article 238 of the Treaty
to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, these agreements were later formalized and
called “Europe Agreements” (see Table 2). Important sections of the Europe Agree-
ments that related to international trade became effective in March of 1992. Toward the
end of 1993,  these provided a solid framework for the Union to deal with the Visegrad
group composed of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. What is special about these
agreements, going well beyond issues of trade, is that policymakers envisaged the political
dimensions of Europe’s unification. The European Council meeting in Essen in December
of 1994 introduced practical programs of assistance similar to 1989’s PHARE (the French
acronym for Poland and Hungary Assistance for Economic Restructuring) to encourage
accession of the CEECs to the EU (Mayhew, 1998, pp. 21-25).
At the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, criteria were established—now known as the
"Copenhagen Criteria"—laying out the conditions for CEEC accession. These criteria
specified that the CEECs first had to start functioning as democracies. In addition, each
country had to demonstrate that it successfully could provide the legislative and regula-
tive underpinnings for a functioning market economy—and then make it work. Finally,
each country was obliged to prove that its economy could cope with the intensified
competitive pressures it would encounter upon accession, when coming head-to-head
with the advanced market economies of Western Europe. The Copenhagen Summit’s
shortcomings were that it failed to specify a timeline for accession and expressed only in
general terms the criteria for EU membership, omitting the specifics.
Additional important steps toward CEEC accession have been made at summits or-
ganized by the European Council. The Essen Summit, resulting in the “Essen Strategy,”
along with policies from the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), created
concrete tasks for the EU and the CEECs to begin to undertake. A white paper dealing
with the preparation for the accession of prospective new members was promulgated. At
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took over some part of the leadership role from the European Commission. In Madrid
Germany’s Chancellor Kohl was a main spokesman for EU enlargement. Finally, with
the Berlin Summit in 1999 and the promulgation of “Agenda 2000,” concrete offers for
negotiations with the first round of proposed entrants were established (Mayhew, 1998,
p. 36).
In the field of economics, the CEECs made major steps toward economic liberaliza-
tion and EU integration within the framework of the Europe Agreements. However,
trade liberalization between the EU and the accession countries was conceived to be
asymmetric.  Asymmetry resulted as the EU lifted trade restrictions caused by tariffs
much faster than did the CEECs. Nevertheless, in areas involving trade goods known to
be sensitive to import prices, e.g., coal, steel and agricultural products, trade restrictions
were removed at a slower pace. As a result, the Europe Agreements were criticized by
the CEECs, because the above-mentioned sectors provided the few areas in which they
exhibited comparative advantages in production for export. The EU, for its part, feared
that CEEC enterprises were not operating on the basis of fair cost calculations, espe-
cially in these price-sensitive and import-sensitive sectors. In the 1990s measures to
prevent dumping were launched mainly against underpriced goods in these sectors.
Leaving aside such trade conflicts, however, major advances in economic relations and
especially in trade policy were reached and remained in place until 1997.  With the ex-
ception of agricultural products, the EU lifted trade restrictions on goods from the
CEECs, even for import-sensitive products such as steel and textiles. At the same time,
most of the tariffs affecting trade on the CEEC side also were removed, and the re-
maining tariffs are expected to be fully eliminated in 2002.
What remains to be dealt with forthrightly on both sides of Europe’s lingering trade
divide is, above all, the abolition of non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs). In addition, the
CEECs still face the challenges of implementing EU standards and norms. Finally, trade
in agricultural commodities and foodstuffs needs to be further liberalized by both sides.
This process of freeing trade flows is well under way and could possibly be completed
in 2002. However, our research suggests that the lion’s share of trade between the EU
member states and the CEECs has already opened up. Additional trade expansion ef-
fects might occur when, for example, border controls are removed. Trade-creation ef-
fects stemming from the full opening of borders are estimated to reach from five to fif-
teen percent of trade volumes (Breuss, 2001; Keuschnigg and Kohler, 1999).
Important steps toward the liberalization of capital flows have been made in the tran-
sition countries seeking accession. In most countries benefiting from FDI flows, regula-
tions were introduced speedily in order to establish international standards. By the mid-
1990s all CEECs had joined the IMF. Those more advanced CEECs such as Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic are members of the OECD (Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development). Although some of the CEECs maintain several
short-term capital controls, these easily can be abolished in the coming years. Hence
most of the so-called “four freedoms” of the EU’s internal market already have been
realized. These include the unrestrained movement of goods, of capital, of labor and of
services. What is left to liberalize further are variables primarily of political importance,
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Labor migration, for example, has proved extremely sensitive as a political issue.
This is especially true in border states such as Germany and Austria, whose citizenry
have voiced fear of an “Übersiedlungstrom” driven by a massive resettling of economic
refugees from the CEECs to Western Europe. At the same time, migration’s economic
importance has remained a secondary consideration. From the perspective of business
interests in these two countries, an inflow of qualified labor likely would prove a boon.
Adapting and implementing EU environmental and social standards is proving a costly
and complicated operation for the accession countries. We forecast that transition peri-
ods of five to ten years will be implemented to deal with the political issues involving
CEEC labor migration and environmental standards.
In sum, though real progress has been made in the last decade, Eastern enlargement
continues to be a long, drawn-out process. The EU’s enlargement program is expected
to be finished when the full range of EU policies is applied fairly to all CEECs and
when all transition periods are completed after the initial accession. Thus we expect that
the current EU members, as well as the CEECs invited for accession, will be sitting be-
fore a full plate of challenges over an extended period of time.
The enlargement ball leading toward CEEC accession and full-fledged membership
began to roll in about 1990. We anticipate that the first round of CEEC accession will
take place in 2004 or 2005, with the last of the entrants joining in the second decade of
the twenty-first century. In addition, we estimate that all transitional arrangements for
those countries coming in with the first and second accession rounds finally can be
abandoned in approximately 2015. At that time the CEECs should be integrated fully as
bona fide members, with all the associated privileges enjoyed and responsibilities
shouldered by Western members.
3. Enlargement Scenarios
Although Agenda 2000 neither clearly stated nor formally fixed the terms of Eastern
enlargement, it nevertheless was understood that enlargement would proceed in two
major rounds, the first of which, referred to as the Luxembourg Round, includes Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. Originally, these six coun-
tries were expected to enter as a group in a first accession round in 2002, since they
were deemed furthest along with fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. Slovakia (for politi-
cal reasons), Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania (referred to as the Helsinki
Group)
5 were judged to be behind with their transitions from planned to market econo-
mies. Thus the leaders and populations of the latter five countries were left to cling to
the hope of entering in a second accession round.
Upon more intense scrutiny, however, the differences between likely entrants joining
in the first and second rounds are not really so profound. Some countries, for example,
have made unexpected progress. Faced with the problem of being left behind or even
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left out, Slovakia’s and Romania’s voters chose to change their leaders. Also, because of
its relatively fast pace and thoroughness of transition, Estonia was added to the first
group of entrants. That other CEECs could join the first accession round is also possi-
ble, provided that they, like Estonia, make significant progress with their reforms. The
Nordic EU states, especially Sweden, have pressed for an earlier entry of the two Baltic
states of Latvia and Lithuania.
However, plans changed course rather quickly as the war over control of Kosovo in
the spring of 1999 goaded Europe's leaders to consider the profound consequences of
destabilized countries and regions in Europe's East and Southeast. For a time, the pro-
posed procedure of a two-group entry was abandoned and immediate negotiations on
EU membership were offered to a wider range of countries. This provided those coun-
tries with real hopes for a speedy accession. However, accession criteria based largely
on furthering the interests of peace and stability in Europe failed to consider each coun-
try's progress with fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, and with time it became clear that
Western members were not prepared to deal with the consequences of an accelerated
and unprepared entry of CEECs into the EU. Although not officially declared, an acces-
sion round including the most advanced CEECs, to take place between 2004 and the end
of 2006, is now seen as the more realistic scenario.
Even though EU member states now have shifted away from rapid entry and back
toward stressing the importance of the CEECs’ making measurable advances in imple-
menting reform criteria, we do not think that the process will remain so neat and bu-
reaucratically decided. We envision that Eastern enlargement will proceed either with
the accession of two main groups or as a “Big Bang.”
If it proceeds with the entrance of countries formed into at least two groups, we rea-
son that the first group likely will consist of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slo-
venia, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta. This first group is expected to join the EU in 2004.
We consider 2004 to be the key year because the European Council meeting in Gothen-
burg in June of 2001 established the policy that the countries entering the Union in the
first accession round would also participate in the next round of elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament—to be held in 2004. This perspective was confirmed by the most re-
cent EU council summit in Laeken (Belgium) in December of 2001.
Assuming a step-by-step approach, it is most likely that a second group, consisting of
Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania, will join in 2006. Bulgaria and Romania would join
later, around 2008. There is a possibility that Croatia might enter with this second
group, provided that reforms proceed there. Albania, the Republic of Yugoslavia, Tur-
key and Bosnia might enter shortly after 2010. However, because of historical legacies
stemming from their locations on the periphery of important European developments—
as well as lingering internal problems—these countries might never be invited to enter
(see Table 3).
We think that there is an entirely different scenario deserving of consideration. We
describe this as something on the order of a “Big Bang,” with the first-round accession
of eight CEECs, leaving out Bulgaria and Romania but including Cyprus and Malta. If
accession comes as a Big Bang, we expect it to take place somewhat later than 2004. IfPreparing for the Eastern Enlargement 11
such a scenario occurred at the end of 2004 or 2005, it could not be undertaken without
its fair share of financial risks. Still, it would offer political and administrative advan-
tages.
Waiting until 2005 would assist the EU in buying time, so to speak, which we think it
might well need. The EU could use this extra time to add some degree of economic ra-
tionality to its structural and agricultural policies. In addition, negotiating between the
EU and the accession countries could take longer than anticipated. Finally, the ratifica-
tion process for the “Accession Treaties” has to be approved by the national parliaments
of each of the current EU-15 members. As the Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty demon-
strates, such a ratification process likely will be sticky, even if all goes well. If negotia-
tions with Warsaw prove to be longer and more complicated than anticipated, the EU
members might give up trying to include Poland in the first accession round, because the
entire enlargement strategy of basing accession upon progress in reforms would no
longer prove credible. As one can see, there are advantages to putting off a first accu-
mulation round scheduled for an earlier date and waiting for an accession round that
takes place in one fell swoop at a later date.
From an administrative standpoint, one of the major advantages of the Big Bang sce-
nario is that no temporary EU external borders or special regulations would be needed.
Imagine what it would cost the EU in administrative and physical infrastructure outlays
if it has to erect its eastern border first between the Czech and Slovak republics and then
needs to dismantle it within a few years time, when it would be moved to Slovakia’s
eastern border with the Ukraine! A flexible transitional policy for implementing the
EU’s border-control system might mitigate the expected costs, but having to move the
EU’s eastern border at least two times likely would prove to be a logistical and admin-
istrative headache.
Additionally, the ratification process surely would alter the existing constellation of
power relations between EU members, old and new. We think that EU member states
might prefer to avoid staggering these changes in order to meet them head on. The Big
Bang scenario is not incompatible with the political commitment that new member
states should participate in the elections of the EU Parliament in 2004. If it turns out that
accession negotiations are completed but not yet ratified, elections could be held in the
CEECs and their elected deputies might serve as parliamentary observers until the date
when their full membership is finalized.
From a tactical point of view, the European Commission does not and probably
should not officially support this Big Bang scenario, but in its latest progress reports and
strategy papers the European Commission is showing more and more signs that ten
countries will be ready for membership at the same time (European Commission, 2001).
We believe that the Commission’s goals are: one, to maintain an advantageous bar-
gaining position relative to the accession countries, and two, to keep pressure for re-
forms in place so that the candidate countries make needed progress as the dates for
accession draw near.
We find that the Big Bang scenario has other shortcomings. If the accession prepara-
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step-by-step approach of allowing accession of those countries fully prepared to meet
the EU entry criteria outlined above would prove much more appropriate. The EU can-
not operate with too many exceptions to its rules regarding transition periods for CEECs
without endangering its administrative capacity and internal coherence (Quaisser,
2001a).
At this point in time, our knowledge regarding which countries will proceed with ac-
cession—and when—is limited to intelligent conjecture, based on available research
material. It would be naive to believe that Eastern enlargement would proceed according
to a detailed and precise blueprint. Too many players are operating with wholly different
and sometimes competing interests. Thus, the crucial decisions over procedures for
Eastern enlargement will be made based upon a bargaining process that can be expected
to “liven up” in the eleventh hour. This is a familiar tendency and pattern that we have
observed taking place at almost every EU summit. Eleventh-hour bargaining excitement
was indeed the order of the day in Nice. Consequently, we expect that many variables
and interests will come into play when the ultimate decisions must be made regarding
which particular countries will enter, the specific timing of entry, as well as the condi-
tions for accession.
Nevertheless, real evidence exists that the European Commission would like to finish
the first round of enlargement toward the end of 2004 with a bigger group of ten candi-
dates (all CEECs except Bulgaria and Romania). This is not a secret but a clearly for-
mulated aim of the European Commission that it even published in a strategy paper.
6
Many of the existing member states, especially Germany and Austria, also prefer a date
of entry for a first round of entrants in 2004 or 2005. But uncertainties remain. What is
likely to occur if the Nice Treaty is rejected for a second time in an Irish referendum?
The first “No” vote on the part of the Irish citizenry demonstrates that, even for a popu-
lation that has benefited enormously from the support extended by the EU over the last
three decades, there remains little enthusiasm for enlargement among the public. The
outcome of the Irish referendum suggests that the road to EU enlargement will be
bumpy.
If the current EU-15 members find themselves unable to form a consensus or under-
take what we deem are necessary reforms, we think that negotiations will grow increas-
ingly sticky. The result could be that Eastern enlargement is blocked. Thwarting the
stream of progress could take place in the eleventh hour through a stonewalling com-
bined with a formal rejection of the accession treaty in one or more of the EU-15’s na-
tional parliaments. A similar type of rejection could also occur in accession countries
when a national population voting in a referendum finds the terms of accession unten-
able. These two plausible turns for the worse thus demonstrate the level of responsibility
of all of the political players: each needs to move quickly and effectively to bring this
project, with its great historical overtones, to a successful conclusion.
                                                
6 The blueprint for accession is described in the EU Commission’s Strategiepapier zur Erweiterung
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TABLE 3
Enlargement Scenarios
First Scenario: Smaller Group Entries
Projected Year
of Entry


























































(with Croatia, 9.4) 21.4
Sources: Eurostat, authors’ estimations
4. Negotiation and Fulfillment of Entry Criteria
Since March of 1998, the EU has negotiated with the Luxembourg Group, whose mem-
ber states include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus.
Since February of 2000, the EU started negotiating with the Helsinki Group, whose
members include Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania. From a technical
point of view, EU negotiations with the Luxembourg and Helsinki groups are subdi-14 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
vided into twenty-nine negotiation chapters that represent major areas of the Acquis
Communautaire, the common set of rules and regulations adopted by all EU member
countries. With most of the countries of the Luxembourg Group, most of these chapters
already were closed provisionally at the time of this writing. Within the Helsinki Group
and with countries such as Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania, a similar
number of chapters were also closed. However, presenting a detailed account of the ne-
gotiations is difficult indeed, since they remain in a state of flux, changing almost un-
predictably over time.
From the standpoint of technical negotiations, Poland is judged to lag behind as a
member of the Luxembourg Group for two important reasons. First, Poland has proved
reticent in accepting transition arrangements that would limit the free movement of
Polish labor to Western Europe. Second, Poland has proposed an extended transition
period for capital flows, especially those that would involve the purchase of its agricul-
tural lands. Poland’s balking on issues of outward labor movement and inward capital
flows portends that it will fall further behind in its accession negotiations relative to
other members of its group over the course of the year ending in July 2002.
It remains likely that the Polish government formed after the September 2001 elec-
tions will demonstrate greater flexibility in dealing with these two issues. Nevertheless,
these topics remain sensitive, and Poland’s failure to comply could lead to a situation
whereby the EU member states resolve to vote in favor of a smaller CEEC enlargement
that only includes Hungary, Slovenia and probably Estonia and the Czech Republic. For
Germany, this would hardly be acceptable, given its historical and current interests in
having Poland as an EU member and its desire for open access to purchase Polish agri-
cultural lands.
To promote a speedy negotiation process, the European Commission has asked pro-
spective member states to present the substance of their negotiating positions in areas
such as labor-market policies (already achieved), and agriculture and structural funds
(still under negotiation). Germany and Austria succeeded in convincing other EU mem-
ber states that it was in Western Europe’s interest to implement a five- to seven-year
transition period that restricts the free movement of CEEC labor into the EU. Germany’s
small political victory was not achieved without frictions. Spain played its “structural-
funds card,” meaning that Spain would only back Germany’s and Austria’s labor-market
proposal if Spain continued to receive the same level of structural funds as it had in re-
cent years. However, Spain’s negotiators were isolated, and Spain’s prime minister, Jose
Mari Aznar, eventually backed down from this hard line and accepted the German and
Austrian proposal.
Nevertheless, the power play is still going on and is expected to last as long as the fi-
nal rounds of bargaining over the terms of EU entry continue. In the first six months of
2002, when Spain takes its turn with the EU presidency, a decisive round of accession
negotiations likely will take place, during which such issues as agricultural-policy and
structural-fund reform will be addressed. However, serious negotiations cannot begin
until the EU member states work out their positions. This is likely to prove difficult,
since the financial implications of reforms could fire up passions that will come out as
heated debates and posturing by political leaders in France and Germany, who facePreparing for the Eastern Enlargement 15
election campaigns in 2002. In addition, Cyprus has the potential to provide real strains
to the coming negotiations, as this island remains divided into Turkish and Greek zones.
(Greece, but not Turkey, is an EU member, and both Greece and Turkey are NATO
members.) In sum, expansion eastward will certainly alter the existing balance of power.
New political constellations will emerge as EU member states jockey for position within
an enlarged European Union.
It remains important to bear in mind that the timing of Eastern enlargement depends
not only on the outcome of technical negotiation procedures but also on how quickly
and thoroughly the CEECs fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria.
7 Although these criteria are
formulated and measured in a manner that is not especially scientific or even systematic,
their fulfillment nevertheless represents an important yardstick, and literally serves as
the measure for progress toward the CEECs’ achieving accession and full-fledged EU
membership. The political criterion that all likely accession countries be voters’ democ-
racies that also respect minority rights has, to a large extent, already been fulfilled. Nev-
ertheless, there remain deficiencies in political and institutional spheres that also might
affect the CEECs’ abilities to fulfill economic criteria and achieve expected levels of
economic performance (Quaisser, 2002).
Corruption, for example, still remains widespread in some of the CEECs seeking ac-
cession. Reforms to legal systems are but slowly succeeding, and inefficient administra-
tive structures are reported to undermine entrepreneurship as well as the implementation
of major EU policies and laws. Nevertheless, we believe that raising legal and adminis-
trative standards to the EU level is an absolute precondition for accession. Both the EU
Commission and individual member states are well aware of the problems that tend to
arise if and when entry criteria are not met and practical considerations prove increas-
ingly important, as was the case with Greece’s entry in the 1980s. Still, we think that the
legal obstacles will be dealt with and, for the most part, overcome in the next three or
four years.
The CEECs’ fulfillment of the EU’s economic criteria for accession appears to be
harder to achieve than political and legal criteria. Economic criteria have to be based on
available data or estimated data, but even the validity and accuracy of data remain open to
interpretation. In addition, institutional changes are hardly measurable in quantitative
terms. In its yearly evaluation of progress made in 2001, the European Commission con-
cluded that most of the accession countries (with the exceptions of Romania and Bulgaria)
more or less already had achieved the status of functioning market economies. Most of the
advanced accession countries already have freed prices and realized a high degree of for-
eign-trade liberalization. Nevertheless, internally there are some kinds of prices that are
still administrated or regulated, such as energy and rent prices, which need to be deregu-
lated further. Market entry and exit are, from a legal standpoint, already secured, but in the
real world several obstacles remain. This is especially true for market exit, where we ob-
serve an avoidance of the practical implementation of bankruptcy laws.
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Macroeconomic policy is more or less solid in most of the CEECs, although internal
and external capital imbalances still pose permanent threats to economic stability. The
Maastricht Criteria, which do not actually specify criteria for EU accession but which do
pose benchmarks for joining the European Monetary Union (EMU), have yet to be
achieved with respect to inflation and interest rates. However, levels of public debt, es-
pecially budget deficits held both internally and externally by advanced accession coun-
tries, already fall in the range of acceptability defined by the EMU (see also Section IV,
chapter 5), though the recent budget crisis in Poland demonstrates that the fiscal system
in the CEECs is far from being in line with EU standards.
The European Commission also considers public consensus over economic policy to
be an important criterion for accession. The advanced accession countries have achieved
broad public support for market reforms, although some resistance led by persistent op-
position groups, whose members are thought to be adversely affected by market-
oriented reforms, still exists. However, what appears most important is that the political
elites of both left- and right-wing parties have managed to endorse major and substan-
tive market-oriented reforms in the interests of achieving EU accession. Another im-
portant element for achieving a functioning market economy has to do with the structure
of financial markets. Though the CEECs’ financial markets have progressed to a re-
spectable level of functioning, substantial progress still needs to be made. Of all the
CEEC countries, Hungary is the most advanced in transforming its financial sector,
mostly because large parts of it are now owned by foreign firms.
Much more difficult to achieve is the second set of economic criteria, which ensures
that the accession countries will be able to cope with competitive pressures associated
with a single European market. In economics the term “competitiveness” stands as a
fairly vague term that is poorly defined: it could relate to enterprises, industrial branches
or even to an entire national economy. Some economists, such as Paul Krugman in his
Foreign Affairs’ article “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession” (1994), go so far as
to reject “competitiveness” as a valuable or even a useful economic term.
The EU, however, stresses the importance of CEEC competitiveness. Its rationale is
rooted in the fear that the CEECs’ economies might run into deep problems when the
countries enter into and then have to face surviving in a single European market.  If and
when industrial branches in the CEECs face decline, the rising specter of unemployment
might further exacerbate a broad range of political tensions. As East Asian and more
recently Turkish and Argentinian experience shows, serious financial crises based on a
misallocation of capital do indeed occur and could also occur in the CEECs. These
could be instigated by macroeconomic mismanagement and/or by microeconomic dis-
tortions that result from the competitive pressures of confronting the single market. In
addition, accession countries also could face crises affecting their banking sectors, as
did the Czech Republic in 1997, and  Hungary in 1994 and 1995. In both countries these
crises led to substantial devaluations in their respective currencies and caused a serious
economic downturn.
Nevertheless, one might argue that a more intense industrial competition would lead in
the long run to a more solid and competitive structure, with higher levels of GDP growthPreparing for the Eastern Enlargement 17
for the CEECs. Leaders and the public at large in the existing EU states as well as in the
aspiring CEECs have hope that this optimistic scenario indeed may come to pass.
TABLE 4
Ranking According to Various Economic Criteria
(Market Economy and Competitiveness)
The ranking is based on the EBRD Index, our own evaluations as well as the IMD Index
EBRD 2001
1 IMD Index 2000
2 IMD Index 2001
2
Poland 3.5 38 47
Czech Republic 3.4 40 35
Hungary 3.7 26 27
Slovenia 3.4 36 39
Estonia 3.6 22
Slovakia 3.3 - 37
Latvia 3.2 - -
Lithuania 3.3 - -
Bulgaria 3.1 - -
Romania 3.1
Portugal - 29 34
Spain - 23 23
Greece - 34 30
1 The EBRD Index ranges from 1 (worst) to 4 (best) and is based on the annual evaluation of the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The presented index is calculated as the arithmetic aver-
age of eleven single EBRD indicators. 
2 The IMD Index is based on the annual evaluation of the Interna-
tional Institute for Management Development in Geneva. This index represents the ranking position of
forty-nine industrialized and emerging economies according to their ability to provide an environment in
which enterprises can compete. Number 1 is the best position and number 49 the worst. The index is
based on 286 different criteria.
Sources: EBRD, Transition Report (various editions); IMD (2001)
Important for the EU’s evaluation of the CEECs’ competitiveness criteria is whether
accession countries have reached a sufficient endowment of human and physical capital
to provide them with a good start when they finally become bona fide EU members.
With regard to competitiveness criteria, such Luxembourg Group members as the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia stand in good stead, since each country possesses a
developed infrastructure, modern industrial machinery and well-qualified labor. Poland
appears to be lagging a bit behind with respect to these criteria. Bulgaria and Romania,
two members of the Helsinki Group, seem to possess real deficiencies for fulfilling18 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
competitiveness criteria, especially in the field of physical infrastructure. That is the
reason why we suggest that these countries should enter at a later date.
Another criterion that needs to be considered and fulfilled specifies that the state
sector must retreat from its historical role in a communist system as an active and direct
participant in the economy. In addition, the EU’s competitiveness criteria require that
the reformed CEECs  create a well-structured legal system with incentives to support a
robust economic performance in the private sector. Laws affecting industrial organiza-
tion and degrees of competition in an accession economy already have been introduced
formally. However, a danger exists that the strict implementation of EU competitiveness
policy might cause problems for specific industrial branches in some of the accession
countries. Although this should not serve as an argument for delaying EU accession,
sooner or later CEEC enterprises will have to adjust to the competitive pressures of a
single market. The results will be that competitive pressures will promote structural
changes that should serve as the source of welfare gains. We develop this idea further in
the section below.
Privatization mostly has been achieved in such countries as Hungary and Slovenia,
and to a large extent in Poland, Estonia and the Czech and Slovak republics. But a more
detailed view shows several deficiencies. As late as 2001, forty-five of Poland’s largest
enterprises were still state owned. All CEECs still face the challenge of improving cor-
porate governance and the restructuring of enterprises. Small and medium-sized enter-
prises seem to be emerging as the motors driving forward economic growth and struc-
tural change in the CEECs. However, the benefits they may bring are limited, since the
economic futures of smaller firms are not considered to be especially favorable in a
world in which capital has a historical tendency to be consolidated and centralized into
ever-larger units. An additional problem related to such small and medium-sized firms
is the fact that they face real limitations in their access to investment funds. Small play-
ers tend also to be excluded from benefiting from the enforcement of a host of legal de-
crees, because they cannot muster the funds to pay for legal representation or to buy
political clout. In general, smaller firms suffer from a lack of political representation, as
their disposable funds for lobbying are limited.
In sum, according to our own estimates, Hungary and probably Slovenia have a good
chance of fulfilling economic criteria—including what the EU determines as “competi-
tiveness”— by 2002. Poland and the Czech Republic, on the other hand, are likely to
fail at achieving the level of competitiveness required for a 2002 accession, although we
expect them to achieve it by 2004 or 2005. These two countries face different problems.
Poland, for example, has to deal with burdensome legacies from its past as a planned
economy, especially its oversized coal and metallurgical sectors. In addition, Poland’s
agricultural sector has long been based on small holdings that could hardly emerge as
viable in the EU. The Czech Republic, for its part, appears unable to solve shortcomings
with corporate governance, especially in its banking sector—a sector that is additionally
burdened and overshadowed by a mountain of nonperforming loans.
Each of the accession countries being considered has to make substantial progress in
the fields mentioned above in order to be prepared for EU accession. However, one
should neither require nor expect that the prospective countries solve all their accession-Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement 19
related shortcomings, such as structural and economic problems, prior to accession.
This, after all, never was realized practically by some of the most advanced EU coun-
tries, such as France, Germany and Italy, even though these countries’ economies are
noted for achieving comparatively high levels of per capita output.  Though there are no
efforts on the part of EU officials to advertise it, if and when accession is deemed to be
the desirable and appropriate step necessary for Europe’s unity, achieving this policy
goal could well take precedence over apparent shortcomings in fulfillment of entry crite-
ria. We may all be surprised by the speed and effectiveness of those policymakers fa-
cilitating accession, and by their seemingly cavalier approach toward waiving what have
been held up as sacred criteria.20 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
III. Economics of Enlargement
1. Review of Growth and Welfare Effects
We find that the rich legacy of economic theory provides a deep-seated logic that sup-
ports Eastern enlargement as part of a greater European integration. Thus our analysis
goes beyond that of Kampeter (2000), who focuses only on the political rationale for
European integration. It also goes beyond the economic analysis—based on traditional
trade theory—of Dicke and Foders (2001), who predict no major positive economic im-
pacts of Eastern enlargement but only fiscal costs. Their arguments are based on the
assumption that trade and factor markets (labor and capital) with the candidate countries
are already liberalized to a large extent. Using regression calculations, they also find no
empirical evidence of positive economic effects of past EU enlargements.
However, their analysis does not consider important additional integration effects
based on modern integration theory. To support our perspective, we build on a range of
contributions to economic analysis that emphasize the benefits associated with eco-
nomic integration. Studies by Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a and 1999b); Baldwin,
Francois and Portes (1997); Breuss and Schebeck (1996); Brown, Deardorf, Djankov
and Stern (1997); and more recently by the European Commission’s DG ECFIN (2001)
and by Breuss (2001) suggest that the economic benefits of enlargement will outweigh
its costs.
Integration theory teaches us that welfare gains and higher rates of economic growth
stem from better resource allocation (known as static efficiency) when tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) are removed. Each of the integrating regions is expected
to gain if trade creation outweighs trade-diversion effects. Higher dynamic efficiency is
driven by rising levels of investment and improved capital efficiency. The more sophis-
ticated general equilibrium models of Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a and 1999b) also
include effects (such as intensified competition) that modern trade and integration theo-
ries associate with a united economic area. For example, larger markets lead to in-
creased product differentiation, as they contribute toward expanding output through in-
creasing returns to scale. Formation of a single, integrated EU market diminishes price
segmentation, and not only for the purchase and sale of goods and services but also for
capital funds and labor.
However, the distribution of growth effects and welfare gains is indeed asymmetrical.
Since the CEECs’ economies are small relative to those of current EU members (when
taken together, they scarcely produce more than four percent of the EU’s GDP), existing
EU members can expect only modest growth effects resulting from integration. What is
more, the lion’s share of these growth effects already have been realized and absorbed
through a liberalization of trade that began in 1992. Thus, after the start of accession, the
average one-time jump in the EU-15’s current levels of GDP is unlikely to be higher
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EU study (DG ECFIN, 2001) was more optimistic, estimating steady-state effects to
reach 0.5 to 0.8 percent of the EU’s annual GDP. We think, however, that selected
CEECs can expect one-time jumps ranging between five and seven percent of their cur-
rent output levels (Brown et al., 1997; Quaisser, 2000).
Gravity models depicting EU trade with the CEECs indicate that welfare gains deriv-
able from trade flows already have reached expected postaccession levels, given such
parameters as distance and per capita incomes of the CEECs in relation to the existing
EU members (Brenton and Gros, 1997; Brenton and Di Mauro, 1998). Gravity models
based upon estimated purchasing-power exchange rates forecast higher potential rates
for GDP growth as a result of trade expansion (Schumacher, 2001). We also expect ad-
ditional welfare gains associated with the removal of nontariff barriers to trade (NTBs)
upon accession. As border-maintenance costs are reduced vastly, we estimate reductions
in real-trade costs between five and fifteen percent of the value of trade flows. We also
expect additional welfare gains from the decline of risk premiums for Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) as prospects for economic and political stability in the region improve.
At present, however, theory is anticipating practical experience. Thus our work heeds
the advice of Breuss (1999), who is critical of the ubiquitous models based on partial
and regression analysis. He argues that such models cannot address adequately the im-
portant integration effects that are likely to emerge with Eastern enlargement. In addi-
tion, general equilibrium models, such as those used by Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a
and 1999b), only can investigate effects for single countries. General-equilibrium models
also are sensitive to such variables as the role played by price elasticity of demand in for-
eign trade, though these types of models neglect short-term adjustment costs, especially in
the labor market (see listing of models and their calculations in Table 5).
The Polish economist W. Orłowski (2001) tries to combine a general-equilibrium
model of the European economy with a model of endogenous growth ("Millenium”).
Compared to other models, Millenium strongly emphasizes the dynamic effects of en-
largement, i.e., the higher propensity for investments. Orłowski calculates net enlarge-
ment effects for the EU-15’s GDP that far exceed those of other models. He predicts
that the GDP steady-state effect between 1998 and 2014 will be about one percent—
double that of a nonenlargement scenario. For Germany alone, he estimates a net effect
of 2.3 percent of its GDP over the above time period. According to Orłowski, smaller
border states to the East like Austria, Finland and Sweden would benefit even more than
Germany (4.5 percent of their GDP), while all other EU-15 member states would in-
crease their net effect by 0.5 percent. In the Millenium model the CEEC countries would
be the distinct winners, with an increase of fourteen to thirty-five percent of their GDP.
We suspect, however, that Orłowski’s model overstates the enlargement effects. Dy-
namic effects are still poorly understood, especially in transformation countries. The
recent study by Breuss (2001) seems to provide a more realistic estimate. He undertakes
a fresh evaluation with his world macroeconomic model, taking into account the full
range of possible integration effects from such variables as trade, a single market, the
movement of FDI capital and labor migration. To estimate the overall welfare effects,
Breuss uses information on costs derived from Agenda 2000, which he adjusts to his22 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
TABLE 5
Welfare Effects of Eastern Enlargement on the EU
(Measured as Percent Changes in the GDP Steady State)
Author (s) Considerations, Progress Toward Integra-
tion, Time Frame
Effects






Eastern enlargement, welfare effects Stat 0.1% to 0.2%
Baldwin, Fran-
cois, Portes, 1997
Eastern enlargement, welfare effects meas-




Breuss, 1999 Effects of Eastern enlargement for individ-







Effects of Eastern Enlargement with five
CEECs on Austria’s economy. Growth and











Effects of Eastern enlargement with ten
CEECs on Austria’s economy, growth and










Effects of Eastern enlargement for Ger-
many’s economy, growth and welfare ef-












Breuss, 2001 Effects for EU-15 when the Luxembourg Group
enters in 2005 and the Helsinki Group enters in




Orłowski, 2001 Effects for EU-15 when all CEECs (including
Malta and Cyprus but without Bulgaria and





1 Stat = static increases in efficiency (i.e., reduction of trade costs, as effects of economies of scale); Dyn
= dynamic welfare effects (growth stimulated by higher rates of accumulation of physical and human
capital); Integra = full-integration effects of the EU’s single market (ending price segmentation; introduc-
ing monopolistic competition; effects from free flow of goods, capital, labor and services); Inv = effects of
FDI considered as reductions of risk premiums associated with investing in CEECs; Migr = effects of
migration with respect to a seven-year transition period. 
2 If not otherwise mentioned, refers to growth
effects. Growth =  growth effects; Wealth = welfare effects. The difference between growth and welfare
effects is that the latter consider necessary investments for future growth that reduce consumption.
Sources: from relevant literature sources listed in ReferencesPreparing for the Eastern Enlargement 23
own enlargement scenario. As we show in the following section of this paper, cost cal-
culations tend to underestimate the amount of funds needed to carry out Agenda 2000.
Breuss, who also shares this perspective, estimates that, on average and with respect to
their real GDPs, the CEECs will gain nearly ten times more from enlargement than the
old EU-15 members. Poland and Hungary are expected to increase their real GDP out-
put by nearly eight to nine percent over a decade’s time, and the Czech Republic by five
to six percent over the same period.
On average, the current EU-15 members would benefit from a one-time gain of about
0.5 percent of their GDP over a six-year period following CEEC accession (2005-2010),
but this gain will be distributed unevenly among the countries. Most important to con-
sider is the future character of political bargaining. Tensions related to the controversial
question of how such gains will be distributed among the EU-15 have already emerged,
and we expect them to grow even sharper as the estimated gains appear increasingly
real.
Breuss (2001; see also Table 6) speculates that Austria, Germany and Italy will be
among the greatest beneficiaries of CEEC accession, accruing between 0.5 and 0.7 per-
cent as a one-time jump in the steady state of their economies. In the case of Italy, the
strong positive impacts also are confirmed in a study by Grassini (2001). Spain, Portugal
and Denmark are expected to suffer small welfare losses, mainly because these countries
are unlikely to benefit as much from the hoped-for integration effects and probably will
experience declines in the levels of funds currently received (Breuss, 2001). In addition,
a study on Denmark—based on a macroeconomic model—shows that the overall effects
for the economy will likely be slightly negative in the short run, but slightly positive in
the long run (Kristensen, Jensen, 2001). In Breuss’s view (2001), Eastern enlargement
could take the form of some kind of “exogenous shock,” leading to asymmetric impacts
on different EU countries’ business cycles. Enlargement also exhibits the potential to
impair the desired effects of monetary policy in the euro zone. Nevertheless, Breuss
considers Eastern enlargement to be largely a “win-win” situation for both the current
EU-15 and the potential accession countries.
A recent EU Commission study (DG ECFIN, 2001) arrived at similar results. Their
study is also based on a macroeconomic model (a slightly modified standard neoclassi-
cal growth or Solow model), taking into account what they judge to be important inte-
gration effects, as well as what we see as hopeful cost calculations. All CEECs together
would expect increases to their GDPs of between one and three percent, depending on
the time span considered and whether a more optimistic scenario is considered. These
effects are derived mainly from a more effective use of resources caused by structural
changes and the introduction of competition. In addition, higher levels of EU transfer
payments and growing flows of FDI would increase the investment ratios.
The DG ECFIN Study (2001) purports that the effect of enlargement on the EU-15
will be a cumulative increase in GDP of between 0.5 and 0.7 percent over one decade,
starting in 2000 and ending in 2009. Distribution effects among EU member states are
expected to be similar to those estimated by Breuss. What is striking in the DG ECFIN
Study is that absolute GDP growth effects from migration seem to be larger than from
trade. However, it is noted that labor-market rigidities in Europe could prevent a full
absorption of migrants, thereby leading to a lower level of welfare effects. The study24 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
anticipates beneficial effects on market competition from enlargement, although it con-
fesses that these are difficult to quantify ex ante. This also holds for TFP (total factor
productivity) increases, which were evaluated with a wide margin of error (DG ECFIN,
2001, p. 35).
TABLE 6
Likely Winners and Losers of Eastern Enlargement
(Long-Term Steady-State Effects in Various Model Simulations)
Winners EU-15 Net Effects
Including Costs




Between 0.2 and 0.6
percent of their GDP
Orłowski: between 2.5 and
4.5 percent of their GDP
Long-term costs to be covered by net
payers probably are underestimated;
positive effects from migration might
not materialize since labor markets are
restricted and inflexible; positive effects
of the general catching-up process are
not considered. To the contrary, Orłow-




Between –0.2 and plus 0.2
percent of their GDP in
Breuss (2001); around
zero in Kohler (2000)
Short-term effects might be neutral or
slightly negative, but long-term effects





Between –0.2 and –0.8
percent of their GDP
Orłowski: 0.5 percent of
their GDP
These countries might lose mainly be-
cause of reduced transfers from the EU
budget; however, reduced transfers are
also the result of economic convergence.
Positive integration effects might be
underestimated, since these countries
benefit from indirect effects of other
EU-15 countries, through their demand
on respective partner-country products.
CEEC
All CEECs will win Between 5 and 8 percent
of their GDP
Orłowski: between 14 and
35 percent of their GDP
As CEECs will have to pay immediately
into EU’s budget, they might have
problems absorbing EU funds; in addi-
tion, structural change might cause
short-term adjustment costs that reduce
economic growth
* With countries in parentheses, results differ between various model calculations. Breuss (2001) covers
the effects of the period 2001-2010 and Orłowski 1998-2014, whereas Kohler (2000) represents long-term
steady-state effects without time specification.
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There are problems related to these model calculations that have to be considered.
The EU Commission study (DG ECFIN, 2001) does not mention any negative effects on
the economies of EU-15 countries deriving from the enlargement costs. In addition, as
already mentioned, other studies are based on rather optimistic cost calculations.
Baldwin (1997) and Kohler (2000) use enlargement costs of between 0.11 and 0.21 per-
cent of the EU’s GDP. Recent calculations by Breuss (2001) estimate costs in 2010 of
0.3 percent of the EU’s GDP. Our calculations (see chapter 2.2.) suggest that if political
bargaining does not change, enlargement costs already might rise to 0.35 percent in
2008. Under this assumption, net welfare gains even for "EU-15 winners” (but high net
payers) like Germany, Austria and the Netherlands might diminish substantially. How-
ever, if the economic catch-up process accelerates compared to existing estimates, their
gains would be higher.
Enlargement costs for EU-15 "losing” countries like Portugal, Greece and Spain
might be overestimated. When we project further economic convergence with the EU
average, these countries would lose transfer payments from the EU structural funds
budget even without enlargement. At the same time, positive integration effects for
these countries might be underestimated in many of the models, since these countries
benefit from indirect effects from other EU-15 countries through their demand on re-
spective partner-country products. However, the situation in the CEECs after accession
might be complicated by the fact that they will have to pay immediately into the EU’s
budget but might have problems absorbing EU funds. Intense structural change also
could cause short-term adjustment costs that temporarily reduce economic growth in the
CEECs.
Such considerations demonstrate that unifying Europe is an involved undertaking,
whose expected outcomes are not reduced easily and readily to quantifiable variables.
Economists and their models deal best with such measurable factors as GDP, its growth
rates, welfare effects stemming from trade and the like. But many important variables
and forces that are not readily quantifiable tend to be overlooked. We find that there are
practically no real substitutes for probing analyses seeking to explore important forces
and dynamics not adequately presented in mathematical models.
What would we estimate to be the costs associated with failing to proceed with East-
ern enlargement? Such costs are indeed difficult to measure and might even be larger
than expected. For example, as a consequence of political instability, negative economic
shocks might occur. Foreign investors’ risk-aversion strategies might cause major capi-
tal outflows, resulting in a higher inflation and a downward pressure on a national cur-
rency’s exchange rate. This could be accompanied by economic policy failures—much
more likely to occur without a stability anchor like the European Union—which would
result in a deep recession. The most recent crisis in Argentina should serve as a warning.
Not much imagination is needed to predict the negative consequences for the existing
EU member states. Political stability and the policy orientations of the accession coun-
tries toward the EU likely will engender important economic outcomes that are difficult
to measure when limited to the standard statistical information one can find in national
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What has been referred to as the “policy anchor” argument needs to be considered. It
is based on the observation that the EU has played an important stabilizing role for the
CEECs caught in the seas of transition. It has served in this role since the start of the
CEEC transition, and we expect that it will continue to do so not only until accession
takes place but also later, as the CEECs model themselves into prosperous EU members.
Thus we can expect the CEECs to continue along a reform path that takes them well
beyond the minimum necessary for qualifying as a market economy. This thorough lib-
eralization will include the carrying through of an effective privatization program that
limits state ownership to the production of a portion of public goods. We anticipate the
formulation and implementation of a sophisticated macroeconomic policy that dovetails
neatly with the monetary policies stemming from the CEECs’ membership in the EMU.
2. Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement
Although the road to Eastern enlargement is paved with good intentions, there are high
levels of anxiety among the public in both Eastern and Western Europe. The public’s
level of sophistication tends to be underappreciated by Europe’s leaders. If they cannot
win over hearts, minds and pocketbooks, leaders pressing for Eastern enlargement even
have resorted to such tactics as soliciting the assistance of public-relations firms to con-
duct advertising campaigns to keep public pressures at bay. We suggest that the level of
public skepticism should be understood as a well-founded uncertainty regarding peo-
ple’s personal finances as well as their collective future as Europeans.
Citizens in the East are concerned that economic transformation and EU accession
might change their way of life and special traditions radically—and likely for the worse.
They fear that EU accession portends being thrust too quickly into a competitive market
economy, where time becomes money and anything and everything is transformed into a
commodity that can be bought and sold. Additionally, people in the East have a linger-
ing fear that, if and when they finally are invited to join the Union, they will end up as
second-class members.
Some of the CEECs seem to be enjoying the window of freedom they currently are
experiencing between the breakdown of communism and their incorporation into the
EU. The long span of history provides numerous examples of how the people of Central
and Eastern Europe have been batted back and forth between major powers in the East
such as Russia, and France, Germany and Austria in the West. Does EU accession mean
that it is now time for Central and Eastern Europeans to be dominated yet again by the
West?
This issue could be illustrated by considering the case of Slovenia and the Baltic
states. Over the course of hundreds of years, Slovenia has experienced but one decade,
the most recent ten years, as a sovereign, independent country: the first taste of freedom
and independence since being dominated by the Habsburgs, the Ottoman Turks and the
Yugoslavian Serbs, with a relatively brief but exceedingly tragic round dealt out by the
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Lithuania, which were incorporated into the Soviet Union as a result of the Hitler-Stalin
Pact in 1940, regained independence in 1990. Though EU accession portends to offer
numerous benefits, the Slovenians and the Baltic peoples understandably wish to savor
this brief, recent interlude of real independence.
Citizens of the EU's current fifteen member states, on the other hand, are afraid that
incidents of crime—especially unsavory violent crime—will increase. They expect that
enlargement will have negative effects on their labor markets, causing higher levels of
unemployment. They anticipate a downward pressure on wages provoked and exacer-
bated by a freed flow of goods, capital and labor. Doubts have been raised as to whether
the accession countries as well as the existing EU members really are ready for an East-
ern enlargement, and concern has been expressed that adjustment problems will provoke
additional costs. Many West Europeans believe that it is all happening too fast.
Although many of these voiced and perceived fears are unfounded or exaggerated,
political and civic leaders in both Eastern and Western Europe are faced with trying to
assuage the public’s fears. Otherwise, proceeding with Eastern enlargement may be
threatened by plebiscites with challenging outcomes.
Behind the uncertainty displayed at the Nice Summit in December of 2000 lies a
deeper level of uneasiness. The existing fifteen EU member states worry that Eastern
enlargement will place their hard-earned prosperity on the line, since they will be faced
with making deep financial concessions. They fear that they will have to forego domes-
tic investments because they will be duty-bound to deliver higher levels of transfers to
the CEECs gaining accession. Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece, who are currently net
receivers of cohesion and structural funds as well as agricultural subsidies, are con-
cerned that their existing levels of transfers will be reallocated toward the CEECs upon
their accession. As net payers, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden are afraid
that they will be expected to carry an even heavier financial burden.  How realistic are
such fears? In the section below, we attempt to answer this question.
2.1. Effects of Trade, FDI and Migration on the Labor Market
Exports from the CEECs to the EU will be too small to have significant effects on prices
in commodity markets in Western Europe. According to Boeri and Bruecker (2000),
opening borders will cause but marginal effects on wages and levels of aggregate em-
ployment in the West. For those employed in parts of the metal, textile and apparel in-
dustries, CEEC import penetration is expected to produce downward pressures on
wages while also generating additional unemployment. However, because trade in these
goods started to liberalize in 1992, a sizeable portion of the expected losses already have
been absorbed (see Quaisser et al., 2000). In addition, we should keep in mind that those
sectors are already under competitive pressures from a host of lower-wage countries in
various parts of the world.
Aggregate employment for existing EU members as well as entering CEECs is slated
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capita incomes and levels of productivity. Evidence suggests that distribution effects of
trade will affect less-qualified labor negatively. However, the affected numbers are es-
timated to be miniscule relative to Europe’s total workforce.
The CEECs’ structures of production will transform as their economies catch up with
the West. This should result in an increase in intraindustry trade, with positive growth
effects for both Eastern and Western Europe. Although one could expect that redistribu-
tion effects of an expanding intraindustry trade will register as either marginal or neu-
tral, differences in unit values between EU exports and CEEC imports in identical prod-
uct categories indicate that vertical, intraindustry trade is prevailing. This form of trade
reflects the different factor contents of trade flows, and consequently will have an im-
pact on the distribution of income. However, we anticipate that such results will be off-
set by the overall growth effects of a more thorough integration, and that horizontal,
intraindustry trade will increase over time.
In the presence of large differences in incomes from capital and wages, will capital
movements—especially FDI flowing into the CEECs—raise interest rates in the EU?
Along with Boeri and Bruecker (2000), we view this fear as unfounded. We deem the
magnitude of capital transfers to the East too small to wield influence over the various
prices of capital. Capital flows have been liberalized for some years. Large capital flows
in the form of FDI are expected to increase as CEEC accession reduces risk premiums
on capital invested in the region, but stepped-up flows are not likely to have measurable
effects on the prices of capital in Western Europe. Interest rates, however, stand to fall
in most of the CEECs, thereby helping to foster economic growth throughout this large
region (Buch, 1998).
For a country in transition to qualify for EU accession, it must have completed pri-
vatizing its formerly state-owned industries and agricultural lands. A completed privati-
zation program is deemed essential to lure in additional FDI. Flows of FDI show a clear
preference for strategic and market-oriented investments. Although labor costs play a
role in FDI’s allocation, such costs do not appear to have determining effects. An
evolving division of labor is expected to contribute to rising aggregate employment in
Eastern as well as Western Europe (Quaisser et al., 2000).
Migration emerges as one of the most sensitive of topics. Both citizens and leaders of
the EU-15 worry that poorer people from the CEECs will use accession to relocate le-
gally to Western Europe, where they will alter countries’ ethnic compositions while
burdening already-stretched social-welfare funds. Since trade in goods and services, as
well as capital flows, are unlikely in the short term to lead to an equalization of incomes
between the EU-15 and the CEECs, gaps in wages between regions are expected to per-
sist over a period of years. Consequently, monetary incentives that are known to pro-
mote labor migration—especially higher wage and non-wage compensation—will re-
main factors in the accession process.
Hence, over the short term, labor migration is expected to have greater effects on the
EU labor market than trade and investment. Since Austria and Germany share contigu-
ous borders with some of the CEECs and are relatively close to others, they can expect
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(2000) and Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) predict an annual net migration of close to
300,000 workers, with 200,000 of these heading for Germany. However, they believe
that the number of annual migrants should halve within a decade. An estimation from
the German economic research institute IFO predicts somewhat larger flows of migrants
stretching over a longer period of time (Sinn and Werding, 2001).
There are, however, important reasons why fears concerning the scope and scale of
migration appear unfounded. Over the next few years, Germany and some other EU
member countries are expected to face a growing shortage of labor, especially skilled
labor. The likelihood is that migration from the East will help to offset this labor short-
age at least to a limited degree. In addition, EU proposals for a transition period to phase
in the free movement of CEEC labor leave sufficient flexibility for each EU member to
regulate the inflow according to its needs. These restrictions are slated to come to an end
five to seven years after enlargement takes place.
Over time, we expect that economic growth, welfare gains and successful structural
changes in the accession countries will increase CEEC living standards. Pressures pro-
moting migration thus will subside. Border regions, however, will remain a problem.
They may well experience the effects both of CEEC labor making daily cross-border
commutes and also of an intensified competition in their service sectors. That is why a
special EU program has been designed to deal with the impact of enlargement on border
regions. However, the program is politically controversial and the funds supporting it
are rather limited.
Redistribution effects associated with Eastern enlargement appear relatively small
and comparatively manageable for the EU-15. The CEECs, on the other hand, entered
into a difficult phase of structural changes in the 1990s as they undertook transitions
from planned to market economies. Upon EU accession, such rates of structural change
should accelerate in several geographic areas. However, we need to bear in mind that
these structural changes are the sources for the expected welfare gains. Social and eco-
nomic frictions could be mitigated to some extent by labor-market and social policies.
Increased FDI flows and improved capital efficiency will cause the CEECs’ econo-
mies to move rapidly in the direction of forming structures of production similar to ad-
vanced economies’. Magnified structural changes surely will disrupt familiar patterns of
employment. As firms and even some industries in the CEECs are closed while others
are expanded, the EU will be faced with assisting the CEECs with funds and profes-
sional advice. We would recommend that a substantial source of funds be made avail-
able to the CEECs to facilitate structural changes and the construction of infrastructure
to promote economic growth.
2.2. Financial Implications
In the 1990s a host of studies estimated the costs of Eastern enlargement. Early studies
by Baldwin (1994), Anderson and Tyers (1993) and Courchene et al. (1993) suggest that
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mainly on regression models of expenditures and structural data of existing EU member
states, as well as on voting-power models. Regressions relied on data to project receipts
and contributions from the CEECs to the EU budget. The comparatively low population
of countries making net payments to the EU budget portended that enlargement would
create an even larger financial burden. Baldwin (1994) estimated the total cost for inte-
grating ten CEECs at around 26.7 billion ECUs. To compare this figure with the EU-
15’s expenditures and GNP (Gross National Product) for Fiscal Year 1995, Baldwin's
estimation would approach around twenty-seven percent of the EU's annual budget, or
approximately 0.45 percent of one year's GNP.
Despite differences in methodology, various researchers all have calculated the fi-
nancial costs of the first accession round at between 0.1 to 0.2 percent of the current
EU-15’s GNP. Starting in 2006, and based on criteria adopted at 1999’s Berlin Summit,
about 0.113 percent of the EU’s annual GNP would be needed over several years to fi-
nance Eastern enlargement for the countries in the first accession round. Those five
CEECs would increase the EU from fifteen to twenty countries, and of these twenty the
CEECs would account for about fourteen percent of the enlarged EU’s population.  To-
gether, the new EU members would contribute approximately four percent of Brussels’s
revenues but would expect to receive about 16.8 percent of its expenditures. Although
these figures indicate that the early entrants would benefit from transfers, the existing
EU member states also would not suffer financially, especially when we calculate the
estimated net welfare gains derived through integration.
Hence, at least for the years 2000-2006, the estimated costs of Eastern enlargement
appear to be manageable. Owing to reforms in structural policy, Germany’s net contri-
bution to the EU budget would change only slightly: from 0.54 to 0.58 percent of annual
GDP (Gross Domestic Product). Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland are currently net
receivers of transfer payments, with net transfers ranging between one and four percent
of their GDPs. After Eastern enlargement, these countries are expected to remain net
receivers; however, their net levels of transfers are expected to fall to between 0.3 and
0.8 percent of their GDPs (Quaisser, 2000).
Nevertheless, it is important to take into account that Agenda 2000’s cost calcula-
tions paint an especially optimistic picture because they did not include any direct-
income support payments for CEEC farmers. In addition, the structural-funds payments
for the new member states do not reach the maximum amounts that could be used under
the existing financial scheme. What can we expect if enlargement costs rise faster than
anticipated? Will net receivers of EU transfers accept deep cuts in the levels of funds
they receive? Will net payers into Brussels's budget be willing to assume larger portions
of burden sharing to finance the costs of Eastern enlargement?
The simplest answer to such questions is that the EU budget undoubtedly will be-
come the focus of increased political wrangling between member countries (Mühlber-
ger, 2001). With respect to improved financial positions, the CEECs will emerge as
clear winners after enlargement. These accession countries can expect to gain from
structural funds at an annual rate of up to four percent of their GDPs. Based on empiri-
cal evidence, EU leaders defined these numbers as the maximum amount countries ef-
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new member states, especially when considering how difficult it is for them to reduce
their budget deficits and thus to qualify for admission into the European Monetary Un-
ion (EMU).
Calculations by the European Commission exhibit some uncertainties. The exact
dates of accession and the actual number of countries entering in the first and second
rounds are not etched in stone. As we suggested above, it seems likely that the first
round of entry will not take place till 2004 or 2005. It is worth recalling that the Euro-
pean Council has changed its plans for Eastern enlargement more than once. In recent
years, a larger number of CEECs than originally planned has been invited to attend and
participate in enlargement negotiations. Bringing in more than the proposed five coun-
tries would burden Brussels's budget. However, the weight of the financial burden asso-
ciated with CEEC accession is expected to decline as enlargement is put off to ever-later
dates. As mentioned above, we try in our own calculations to estimate the enlargement
costs based on a realistic scenario. We think that Eastern enlargement, starting in 2004,
likely will begin with the accession of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia,
Estonia and Malta.
8 A second group, consisting of Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Cy-
prus, is expected to enter in 2006. Bulgaria and Romania would follow in 2008.
Enlargement costs for agriculture are calculated on the basis of model simulations
that take into account costs of rural development and market intervention, including
direct payments to farmers (Frohberg, 2001). Adjusted to our enlargement scenario and
expressed in constant 2001 prices, these costs will increase from three billion euros in
2004 to 10.4 billion in 2008.
9 We estimate that structural funds will reach an established
ceiling of four percent of the CEECs’ gross output (Agenda 2000 assumed only three
percent). The full use of the four-percent ceiling is not unrealistic although it might
cause short-term absorption problems.
10 Structural funds and direct payments will be
phased in and should reach their maximum levels for the first and second rounds of en-
largement in FY 2007. These payments are estimated to increase from 8.2 to 21.3 billion
euros in 2008, if we include Bulgaria and Romania in the costs for that year. Other costs
are calculated as we suggest they will be incurred. For Romania and Bulgaria, enlarge-
ment costs are introduced in FY 2008, but the full amount of estimated costs was al-
ready considered for FY 2001 in order to facilitate the necessary calculations (see Table
7 for projected costs over time).
                                                
8 Cyprus might be included into that group if the political problems concerning the division of this is-
land between Greek and Turkish zones are solved.  Since Cyprus and Malta are comparatively small in
size, population and GDP output, their presence or absence affects our calculations only marginally.
9 We used the market-intervention cost estimates from the Economics Institute in Göttingen, which are
about two billion euros higher than those estimated by researchers at the Institute for Economic Research
in Halle.
10 For example: In applying the strict formula of the Berlin summit, most of the new member states
(except Slovenia and the Czech Republic) would receive solely for objective-one funding (cohesion funds
not included) between four and six percent of their GDP.32 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
TABLE 7
Estimated Costs of EU Enlargement
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Ceiling on resources, as
percent of  EU’s GNP
1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27
Share of total agricultural
expenditures, as percent of
EU’s GNP (2000 = 0.52%)
Group entry 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51
Total expenditures for
structural policy, as percent
of EU’s GNP (2000 =
0.41%)
Group entry 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.48
Expansion costs as percent
of EU’s GNP
Group entry 0.17 0.20 0.25 0.35
Enlargement costs as per-
cent of total EU spending
(appropriations for com-
mitments)
Group entry 14.68 17.60 21.9 28.91
1 If not described differently, all amounts refer to appropriations for commitments. Usually costs are calculated as appropria-
tions for payments, as they represent the real flow of money. Normally these amounts are a bit lower because there is a time
lag between when the commitments are made and when the money actually is paid. Because of lack of data, we were only
able to calculate in appropriations for commitments. 
2 “Group entry” assumes that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovenia, Estonia and Malta will enter the EU in 2004; Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Cyprus in 2006; Romania and Bul-
garia in 2008. “Big Bang” assumes that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia,
Cyprus and Malta will enter the EU in 2005; Romania and Bulgaria in 2008. For all these scenarios we assume that the re-
maining preaccession aid will be used for Turkey and selected countries located on the Balkan peninsula. “Agenda” assumes
that the Luxembourg Group will enter the EU in 2004 and the Helsinki Group some unspecified time later. The financial
proposal of the European Commission from January 30, 2001 is in fact identical to the Agenda proposals for the Years 2004
to 2006. This assumes a EU entry of the Luxembourg and Helsinki groups (except Bulgaria and Romania) in 2004. 
3 Appro-
priations for payments as percentage of GNP, including preaccession aid; 
4 Appropriations for payments as percentage of
GNP, without preaccession aid.
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Our calculations suggest that the EU will spend about nine billion euros less from
2000 to 2006 than it itself has calculated, mainly because it is clear to us that enlarge-
ment will start later than the EU leaders earlier assumed. However, the money saved
cannot be used automatically to cover costs in the coming years because the budget is
based on the principle of annual accounting. We believe that a political decision should
be made by the European Council to increase the available funding for accession coun-
tries. This is needed because the actual costs of enlargement are likely to go higher. If
we compare estimates for enlargement costs in 2006, the year with the largest amount of
payments during the time span 2000-2006, ours is five billion euros higher than Agenda
2000’s (see Table 7).
The alternative, “Big Bang” scenario, which we discussed above (chapter II, 3),
would not alter these calculations substantially. (This scenario would involve the acces-
sion of all countries in 2005, except for Bulgaria and Romania, which would enter in
2008.) Our calculations suggest that from 2000 to 2006 the EU would save about
twenty-five billion euros more than it itself calculated in Agenda 2000. Hence, higher
expenditures caused by the entry of more countries could be compensated by the later
date of entry, combined with a delayed phasing-in period. If we again compare the costs
in 2006, then the Big Bang estimation for enlargement costs is only three billion euros
higher than Agenda 2000’s (see Table 7). If we consider only enlargement costs, the Big
Bang scenario is by far the most advantageous for the EU. In fact, our calculations are
not too different from those presented by the European Commissioner for budget affairs,
Mrs. Michaele Schreyer, in her speech to the London School of Economics in February
2001. She estimated that enlargement costs for ten CEEC countries in the year 2006 will
fall between sixteen and twenty-five billion euros (Schreyer, 2001).
In January 30, 2002, the European Commission unveiled a new proposal to finance
its envisaged accession in 2004 of ten new countries (all the CEEC candidates except
Bulgaria and Romania, with the addition of Malta and Cyprus). The proposal is based
on the levels of funding originally foreseen for the years 2004 to 2006 (see Table 6). By
choosing this approach, the EU will have enough resources to finance (under the Berlin
ceiling) the accession of ten instead of six new member states and at the same time to
provide additional funds for critical issues like direct income payments for farmers,
structural policies, nuclear safety, administration capacity and possible budgetary com-
pensation payments for the new member states.
The Commission’s new proposal is an attempt to find a financial solution both for
the new enlargement scenario and for the increasing demands of the new member states,
especially regarding direct payments for farmers. In addition, it attempts to dispel the
old EU member states’ doubts over the solidity of Eastern enlargement’s financing. At
first glance, the proposal seems promising, since the EU’s financial projections for the
years 2004 to 2006 are not threatened and the new spending priorities reflect the needs
of the new member states. However, the proposal has some major obstacles that may
lead to complicated bargaining. Why is the proposal so hard to accept for both sides?
On the one hand, it seems unlikely that CEEC candidates, especially Poland, will be
willing to accept the Commission’s position of a ten-year transition period for integrat-
ing their farmers into the direct-payment system. In fact, they already openly lament34 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
their "second-class membership.” This topic remains very sensitive for the new Polish
government. About forty percent of the Polish population lives in the countryside, and
peasant political parties have a strong voice in the Polish parliament. It should not be
forgotten that accession treaties must be accepted in referenda.
Secondly, existing EU net payers like Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden fear
that the provisions for direct payments will predetermine expenditures in the financial
period 2007-2013. The Commission emphasizes that the proposed transitional arrange-
ment would not prevent any changes in the nature of the system. This statement might
be reflecting the hope that changes within rural-income policy—to make transfers di-
gressive over time—will be implemented in the coming years. If this is the case, East
European farmers would never reach the estimated hundred-percent level of their pro-
jected total amount for direct payments. However, it is unclear if the EU will be able to
change the system before the enlargement. If not, net payers fear, enlargement costs
might explode, because new member states will not be interested in any substantial re-
forms that might reduce their transfers from Brussels.
Therefore, the real problems are liable to come up in the financial period starting in
FY 2007 (Quaisser and Hall, 2001). Calculations starting in 2007 therefore have to con-
sider a broad range of uncertainties. For example, it is difficult to predict the results of
accession negotiations, especially in the field of compensation payments to accession-
country farmers. It is also difficult to know with any degree of certainty what the EU’s
agricultural and structural policies will be after 2006. It seems likely that additional
funds for structural changes in agriculture and rural development in the accession coun-
tries will be necessary. In the long run, if agricultural policy does not change, the new
member states cannot be denied these payments (see chapter IV, 3). For the CEECs, a
“second-class” member status is politically and economically unacceptable. Conse-
quently, established levels of agricultural-compensation payments (or, in the future, in-
come-support payments and structural funds) have to be distributed according to a
common set of rules.
For the purpose of estimating the EU-15's financial obligations after 2007, we follow
an “unchanged political bargaining” scenario. We assume average GNP growth rates of
2.5 percent for the EU-15 and four percent for the CEECs and estimate that the EU-15’s
spending programs will develop at the same pace as in the 2000-2006 period. In our
calculation, EU-15 structural funds will decrease at an annual rate of 1.23 percent, while
agricultural funds increase at a rate of 0.63 percent. We also assume that Bulgaria and
Romania will enter in 2008 and will start to receive their structural funds at a ceiling of
four percent of their GDPs. Our calculations thus render enlargement costs of about
thirty-four billion euros for 2008 (see Table 7). That corresponds to 0.35 percent of the
EU’s GNP. If Croatia is included, costs would increase to about thirty-six billion euros
in 2008 (0.37 percent of the EU’s projected GNP). Our estimates imply that the net wel-
fare gains the EU-15 can expect from Eastern enlargement, which, according to a host
of econometric models, could reach 0.5 percent of the EU-15’s GNP, are still likely to
offset the costs of enlargement.
We define our calculation as a “unchanged political bargaining” scenario because we
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cessions for the 2007-2013 financial period as they did for 2000-2006. The most sensi-
tive aspect is structural policy. We assume that existing member countries will accept a
decrease in spending of 1.23 percent annually (as they did for the years 2000-2013).
This assumption seems justified because overall spending in structural policy could not
be calculated according to the “Berlin formula” for objective-one funding but remains
essentially a political decision. The “Berlin formula” essentially defines the regional
distribution of the overall funds, which are politically decided. With respect to agricul-
ture, existing member states have not been willing to make any substantial concessions
in policy reforms but at the same time have not agreed to return to the “agricultural
guideline” (where agricultural spending increases by 0.74 percent with one-percent GDP
growth).
11 During recent years, agricultural spending was well below this line, reflecting
a lack of desire by both single member states and consumers for an increase in agricul-
tural-spending rates—an attitude that is unlikely to change. Because no substantial re-
forms have been introduced, EU policies will have to be applied fully in the new mem-
ber states. Our "unchanged political bargaining” scenario is based on slightly different
assumptions concerning enlargement costs than the Commission used in its proposal of
January 30, 2002.
12
Concerning enlargement costs, several risks are involved. If structural-policy expen-
ditures increase at the same pace as GDP growth and in accordance with the four-
percent GDP ceiling (maximum absorption), this could lead to an explosion in costs. In
any case, structural-policy expenditure is to be understood as the most dynamic cost
factor over the medium and long term. In addition, an appreciation of CEEC currencies
would further increase their GDP and hence lead to higher transfers. Because of these
uncertainties concerning agricultural expenditures, CEECs might manage to increase
their production potential to a higher rate than anticipated in our cost calculations,
thereby requiring a higher level of expenditure for agriculture. This is most likely to
occur if CEEC agricultural-production quotas are set at high levels, as has been de-
manded by CEEC countries in the enlargement negotiations.
It is instructive to confront our outline with two “status quo” scenarios. The first,
which we call the “high cost scenario,” assumes that spending for old EU member
countries remains constant in real terms for structural policy and that agricultural ex-
penses increase according to the agricultural guideline. An alternative scenario (“status
quo EU-27, DIW”)
13 assumes that all CEEC countries will enter in 2005 and that all EU
policies will be applied strictly according to the EU rules (Weise et al., 2001). This has
important implications, because after accession the EU average of per capita GDP will
decline and a vast portion of EU regions will become ineligible for “objective one”
                                                
11 The “agricultural guideline,” though formally in force, is however not applied to agricultural
spending.
12 The main difference is that in the EC scenario agricultural spending for the candidates is lower and
based on the transitional scheme of ten years for direct income payments for farmers. In addition, expen-
ditures for the "second pillar” of the agricultural policy (rural development), for internal policies and for
administration are higher. Other assumptions remain the same.
13 The DIW also developed other scenarios. We will discuss them in chapter IV, 5.36 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
funding (ceiling: seventy-five percent of the EU’s average per capita GDP) and transfers
from the cohesion fund (ceiling: ninety percent of the EU’s average per capita GDP).
The technical assumptions concerning GDP growth are somewhat different from ours
(two-percent growth for the EU-15; 4.5-percent growth for the accession countries).
FIGURE 1
Estimated Enlargement Costs (Appropriations for Commitments)















Sources: European Commission, 2002; author’s calculations.
Table 8 shows that, even in the “high cost scenario,” the EU’s expenditures in 2008
would not exceed the EU’s ceiling on its own resources (1.27 percent of EU’s GNP),
but the financial margin (the difference between the estimated EU payments and the
EU’s own resources’ ceiling) would decrease to a critical size of 0.05 percent of the
EU’s GNP. However, in 2013 the margin would increase again to 0.12 percent. In our
“unchanged political bargaining scenario,” the margin would reach 0.16 percent of EU
GNP, caused mainly by slower-growing expenditures compared to the EU’s GNP. If we
assume a slower economic growth (two rather than 2.5 percent), then the margin would
shrink to a more critical size. In striking contrast to these calculations, the DIW’s status
quo scenario leads to much lower expenditures, even compared to the existing financial
framework (2000-2006). The financial margin would increase from 0.16 percent (pre-
enlargement Agenda 2000 estimates) to 0.35 percent in 2007 and 0.49 percent in 2013.
Such statistics might lead one to conclude that Eastern enlargement is a substantial cost-
reducing program for the EU, because the strict application of EU spending rules would
lead to a significant reduction of structural-fund expenditures for existing member states
(see Table 8, status quo EU-15 scenario). However, this is not realistic, because it is
political bargaining and not abstract spending rules that will determine expenditures.Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement 37
TABLE 8
Financial Implications of Different Status Quo Scenarios
Financial Margin of the EU, as Percent of EU’s GNP
Scenarios 2008 2013
Unchanged political bargaining 0.06 0.16 (0.13)
3
Unchanged political bargaining, Commission
4 0.06 (0.11)
3
High cost 0.05 0.12 (0.08)
3
Status quo EU-27, DIW
1 0.35
2 0.49
Status quo EU-15, DIW
1 0.46
2 0.35
1 GDP data; DIW assumes EU-15 GDP growth of two percent annually. 
2 2007. 
3 Number in brackets
assumes EU-15 GDP growth of two percent instead of 2.5 percent. 
4 Unchanged political bargaining sce-
nario is based on the adjusted assumption of the European Commission’s financial proposal of January 30,
2002; see text for more detailed description.
Sources: author’s calculations; Weise et al., 2001
In comparison to both the high-cost and the status quo scenarios, our “unchanged po-
litical bargaining scenario” is likely to be more realistic. According to our calculations,
Eastern enlargement well might prove incompatible with the EU spending ceiling es-
tablished at the Edinburgh Summit in December of 1992. This is because additional
burdens on the EU budget must be taken into consideration, including the financial fall-
out from the recent BSE crisis, the costs of the EU engagement in the Balkans as well as
expenditures inherent in an increasingly independent foreign-affairs posture—especially
in military defense. It is unlikely that the net contributors to the EU budget would be
willing to raise the Edinburgh Summit spending ceiling in the future. Therefore, before
FY 2007, when the new financial plans are to begin, reforms in EU agricultural and
structural policies are unavoidable. Such reforms are all the more urgent because Croa-
tia, the Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and Turkey, with its population of more than
eighty million, also might enter the Union between 2007 and 2013.
The DIW scenario shows that the existing net-receiver countries also have a substan-
tial interest in reforms, because the strict application of existing spending rules would
lead to a substantial reduction of their net transfers. Net-payer countries, on the other
hand, are concerned that political bargaining will lead to higher costs. Their desire for
reforms in major EU policy areas stems from the fact that in the past agricultural and
structural policies were shaped more by political bargaining than by rational decision
making. Each enlargement made these policies more subject to political pressures—and
consequently more expensive. Now that spending limits are being considered, the EU
needs new policies to deal effectively with the challenges of taking in the CEECs. Still,
it would be a mistake to limit reforms to financial aspects. For internal (low efficiency)
and external (WTO Round) reasons, changes also will be needed in agricultural and
structural policy (see next section).38 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
3. Prospects of CEECs’ Economic Convergence with the EU
One of the yardsticks used to measure successful economic integration in Europe will be
how well CEECs are able to converge their economies with those of the existing EU
members. As we have presented above, preparation for EU accession is certainly an
important factor promoting growth, but it is a far cry from being the only decisive fac-
tor. In fact, there are different paths toward economic convergence that tend to occur
along with and in spite of different types of policies for macro- and microeconomic
management. This was made clear after the joining of Ireland and Europe’s Southern
countries, which took a variety of growth paths toward convergence with EU standards
(Dauderstädt, 2001a and 2001b). In this section we would like to present some of these
experiences and to pose the question: What might the EU-15 and the CEECs stand to
learn from past experiences? A good way to start is by assessing the economic perform-
ances and growth patterns of the CEECs from the start of their transitions to the present.
At the beginning of the CEECs’ transformation from planned to market economies, a
host of experts predicted a rapid “catching up” process. Nevertheless, it was considered
self-evident that the first phase of the CEECs’ transformation would be accompanied by
an economic downturn, taking the form of real declines in output caused by structural
and institutional adjustments toward markets in Western Europe. The experts assumed
that this short period of contraction would be followed by rapid growth, promoted by the
CEECs’ highly skilled labor force earning comparatively low wages (Quaisser and Vin-
centz, 1999).
Initially, therefore, it came as a surprise that the “transition recession” in the first half
of the 1990s proved deeper and longer than expected. A severe and enduring economic
downturn was especially evident in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States),
which spun off from the collapsed Soviet Union, but the CEECs also were not spared.
The decline in output in these countries registered on average as a twenty-percent de-
cline in GDP (see Table 9).
A new dividing line emerged in Europe’s East as the CEECs, driven partly by their
hope for EU accession, started to expand their economies in the mid 1990s. While the
CEECs at least started to recover losses in output, the CIS economies went deeper into
what appeared to be permanent economic crises that stretched across a vast geographic
area (Rosati, 1999). This CIS region had to wait more than a whole decade before eco-
nomic recovery started, in 1999. Russia, especially, achieved high GDP growth rates in
2000 and 2001 (8.3 percent and an estimated five percent, respectively), which were
supported by higher oil prices. Nevertheless, this economic growth remains fragile.
Prospects for accession to the EU, as well as for the EU’s trade liberalization, certainly
assisted the CEECs in overcoming their transition recessions. But these changes are not
sufficient to explain the striking differences in economic performance between CEECs
and those countries composing the CIS.
A plethora of papers has been written regarding the main causes for transition reces-
sions (Balcerowicz, 1995; Gomulka, 1991; Winiecki, 1991; Brada, King, 1991), but not
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like to stress that differences in starting conditions, including structures and institutions,
were the initial causes of these discrepancies (Rosati, 1999; Quaisser and Vincentz,
1999). In addition, the CIS countries seemed to suffer from a lack of traditional experi-
ence in the functioning of market economies. True, CIS policymakers did put together
reform plans, but they tended to be inconsistent and their implementation unprofes-
sional. There is another important factor to keep in mind. Once the Soviet habit of se-
crecy was removed, what emerged in the CIS countries was a hidden but very deep-
seated tradition of corruption that, to this very day, stands in the way of policymakers’
finding successful solutions to pressing economic problems.
Toward the mid 1990s, when the transition recessions had bottomed out, the CEEC
economies increased their output at an annual average of approximately three percent
(Quaisser and Vincentz, 1999). The EU members’ annual growth rates, on the other
hand, only reached close to two percent. Because of these lackluster growth rates, the
economic convergence of Eastern and Western Europe has proceeded at a snail’s pace.
This point can be illustrated using a simple scenario. Assuming that the EU-15’s aver-
age annual growth rate of per capita GDP hovers around two percent and the CEECs’
rises to six percent per annum, which is rather optimistic, most of the CEECs would
need between thirty and fifty years to achieve the EU average, depending on each coun-
try’s individual growth rate. However, the convergence process could accelerate, to a
degree, through a real appreciation in the value of selected CEECs’ currencies.
The hopes for an accelerated catching-up process also diminished when models of
success in other parts of the globe entered into unexpected crises. The foundations of
seemingly successful economies in East Asia were shaken dramatically by the various
financial and economic crises of the second half of the 1990s. East Asia’s major player,
Japan, entered into and then remained mired in economic stagnation for the duration of
the decade, a situation related to an overvaluation of land prices that precipitated bank-
ing and other financial crises that have yet to be solved. The CEECs’ aspirations of
achieving and then maintaining relatively high growth rates were also dashed. The
economies that had been heralded as grand examples of high growth fell down like a
house of cards. What also helped destroy illusions was that the growth process in East-
ern Europe later came to be understood as nothing more than a slow and difficult recov-
ery back to the pretransition level (Rosati, 1999).
The catching-up process of the New Industrializing Countries (NICs) in East Asia
appears to have been based on high rates of savings, high rates of investment and dra-
matic expansions in exports geared toward earning foreign exchange. The reasons for
the successes and failures of the CEECs’ growth process are markedly different. Unlike
in the East Asian paradigm—based on high rates of savings, high rates of investment,
etc.—the CEECs’ relative successes could be explained as the results of structural and
institutional reforms to what had been planned economies. These reforms introduced
macroeconomic stability to the CEECs’ economies and brought them a bit closer to
West European standards.
It turns out that those countries that were able to achieve macroeconomic stability
and implement a broad economic liberalization were also the first to start the wheels of
growth turning and thus emerge from the transition recession. This view is supported by40 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
various regression analyses (Havrylyshyn and Wolf, 1999; de Melo, Denzinger, Gelb
and Tenev, 2001). A broadly extended economic liberalization, which affected both the
internal workings of the CEEC economies and their external relations (such as trade and
investments), brought improvement to the supply side. This assisted these countries in
overcoming the transition recession. A typical pattern emerged where dynamic small
and medium-sized enterprises were the first sectors to experience expansion in output
and employment. In addition, there is an observable linkage between monetary stabili-
zation and structural reforms. The introduction and enforcement of “hard budget con-
straints” forced state enterprises to adjust to the challenges of the newly introduced mar-
ket conditions. Reforms furthering privatization and improving corporate control fol-
lowed. These, in turn, facilitated needed structural adjustments.
High rates of investments were a basic feature of productivity increases and growth
in East Asian economies. This does not hold for the CEECs. Neither in cross-country
comparisons nor in a time-series analysis have the investment ratios of individual
CEECs explained different rates of growth of output (Quaisser and Vincentz, 1999).
Although there is evidence that quantitative investment figures are important, it is the
efficient use of investments that has proved decisive. Differences in the financial sys-
tems involving corporate control and ownership structures also emerged as significant
factors helping to bring transitional economies out of the deep, prolonged recession that
started in the early 1990s.
With this in mind, it is important to differentiate between the various periods of re-
covery and expansion in the CEECs. In the first period of recovery, the transformation
process involved reallocating and reorganizing the existing means of production. This
helped to facilitate an economic recovery without high rates of investment. In the second
period, the classic growth factors—namely, capital, technological progress and labor—
played an increasingly important role in raising rates of growth in output. Selected
CEECs began to experience this phase of recovery and growth toward the end of the
1990s.
A common feature of the East Asian economies was that they were able to finance
high rates of investment through high rates of savings. For some, there was also a large
inflow of capital as FDI. Since savings ratios are comparatively lower in the CEECs,
their future growth strategies might have to rely more heavily on investing in education
and research—in short, in human capital. In the 1990s there was no apparent link be-
tween inflows of FDI and rates of economic growth in the CEECs (Rosati, 1999). How-
ever, there is some evidence of a link since the start of the current decade. Still, our re-
view of selected experiences of East Asian economies suggests that different patterns of
economic growth are engendered by varying types of foreign direct investment. South
Korea and Taiwan provide clear examples. In South Korea, growth was built upon mas-
sive investments in large Chaebol, while in Taiwan it was built upon comparatively
small, family-owned businesses noted for their flexibility in entering world markets.
We predict that there also will be different patterns for investment and growth among
the CEEC countries. 
Rapid expansion in trade has been cited as an important factor engendering high
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doubt that trade liberalization produced clear results for the CEECs as well, assisting
their economies in overcoming transition recessions. It was astonishing how rapidly the
CEECs oriented their foreign trade away from the collapsed Soviet Union and toward
West European markets in the 1990s. While imports clearly played a role in recovery, it
appears that the expansion of exports toward Western markets provided the real starting
point for the CEECs’ economic growth.
Moreover, research suggests that the changing profile of exports serves as a useful
way to follow structural changes taking place in a transitional economy. It is apparent
that the CEECs made major steps in the direction of an improved export profile—that
is, increasingly knowledge-intensive products were exported with greater frequency.
Hungary, especially, vastly improved its export profile, completely eroding or turning
into surpluses once-sizeable deficits in capital-, R&D- and skill-intensive industries.
Similar but less spectacular changes occurred in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slova-
kia, where the relatively strong export position of the energy sector has been reduced
substantially. This is not the case in Bulgaria and Romania, where the labor-intensive
sectors also retain strong comparative advantages (Landesmann, 2000; Quaisser, 1999).
If we consider the examples of selected countries in East Asia or even of Ireland, ex-
port-oriented growth strategies proved successful when wages remained low relative to
factor productivity. Hence, CEECs would be advised to follow the same growth
course—keeping wages low, or at least keeping wage gains moderate relative to pro-
ductivity growth. At the same time, these countries should rely more and more on in-
creasingly qualified labor. At first glance, the preconditions for such a strategy look
fairly good, as we have every reason to expect that the CEECs will benefit from im-
provements in their labor forces’ capability. At the same time, there are concerns related
to the increase in real labor costs. A growing pressure for higher wages and the intro-
duction of social standards along the lines of prosperous EU members likely would lead
to wage gains moving ahead of productivity growth. If this be the case, social contracts,
such as the one established in Ireland, would be needed to keep unit labor costs at a
competitive level, especially for exported products. Additionally, the real appreciation
of the CEEC currencies, promoted by capital inflows and productivity growth, has had
and will have the tendency further to undermine exports’ price competitiveness. Consid-
ering these tendencies and trends, it is unclear if the CEECs will remain capable of im-
plementing macroeconomic and microeconomic policies that promote the convergence
process.
However, we should not underestimate those factors that might stimulate growth and
thereby promote a more rapid catching-up process. The CEECs enjoy a favorable geo-
graphic location at the front door of Western European markets. They also can expect to
benefit from EU transfers earmarked for the improvement of their physical infrastruc-
ture. In addition, there will be a further expansion of EU production networks that cross
the increasingly invisible border dividing the two regions. The inflow of FDI, as well as
the long-term orientation of the CEECs’ macroeconomic policy toward fulfilling the
Maastricht Criteria, should both drive the economies forward and ensure economic sta-
bility. If the national economic policy of each of the CEECs seeking EU accession suc-
cessfully meets the remaining challenges, the prospects for rapid growth over the com-
ing decades are good.42 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
TABLE 9
Increases in GDP for the CEEC Candidates













Level in Year 2001
Compared with
CEEC Level in
1989 and Other in
1991
CEEC-8, Entry Group 1
Poland -17.8 1992 4.6 146
Hungary -18.1 1994 3.7 113
Czech Republic -18.1 1993 2.0 99
Slovakia -25.0 1994 3.7 110
Slovenia -20.9 1993 3.9 121
Estonia -34.9 1995 4.7 90
Latvia -51.7 1994 4.0 69




-17.0 1993 3.7 121
Southeast Europe, Entry Group 2
Bulgaria -26.7 1994 0.1 81
Romania -25.0 1993 0.6 84
Average
2 -25.2 1993 0.5 84
Southeast Europe, Countries with Stability Packages
Croatia -40.5 1994 4.1 89
Macedonia -36.0 1996 2.8 78
Albania -39.9 1993 6.6 106
Average
2 -38.6 1994 4.1 83
CIS
Russia -47.5 1999 6.4 63
Ukraine -63.1 2000 6.5 37
Average
2 -49.5 1999 6.1 64
1 For the CEECs since 1989, for the Baltic republics and CIS since 1991. 
2 Calculation of averages by
weight with GDP portion for Year 2000. Average is based on calculations from nominal exchange rates
listed in $US. Growth rate for 2001 estimates.
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1999; EBRD (2001)Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement 43
IV. Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement: Institutional and
Policy Reforms
Already by the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, EU policymakers were operating under the
assumption that the EU had to prepare itself for the demanding task of taking in between
ten and fifteen new member countries. At the EU summit in Amsterdam in 1997, an
attempt was made to alter selected EU institutions, but with little success. The next step
came with Agenda 2000, which grew out of the Berlin Summit in 1999. Agenda 2000
proposed reforms to agricultural and structural policy. However, shortly after the Berlin
Summit it became clear that these changes only could be considered as first steps toward
a more comprehensive set of reforms.
The Nice Summit, held in December of 2000, was expected to prepare the EU insti-
tutionally for Eastern enlargement by providing at least some preliminary solutions to
pressing problems. A certain amount of progress was made. For example, a new set of
voting procedures for EU members was established that extended the possibility of ma-
jority voting. Additionally, the Nice Summit provided the legal basis for integrating a
group of core EU member countries. However, although these sorts of newly introduced
procedures are important, they represent little more than a minimum requirement for
managing the first round of Eastern enlargement up to 2006. For the period after 2006, a
range of effective reforms needs to be hammered out and then implemented.
The provisional character of the Nice Summit results is reflected in the fact that a
new IGC (intergovernmental conference) has been planned for 2004. This conference
will seek to define more precisely the competencies of each decision-making level. The
decision on the scope of institutional issues to be worked out at this conference was de-
cided at the European Council meeting in Laeken (Belgium) in December 2001. Euro-
pean leaders provided the conference with a broad mandate, which in fact may lead to a
revision of the Nice Treaty.
The rejection of the treaty by Irish voters in June of 2001 indicates the fragility of the
compromises hammered out at Nice. It remains an open question whether yet another
Irish plebiscite would bring a greater show of support for enlargement. If the Irish again
reject the institutional and decision-making procedures endorsed at Nice, a political cri-
sis that could derail progress toward Eastern enlargement might ensue. Although the
European Commission had stressed that the outcomes of the Nice Summit might not
serve as a precondition for Eastern enlargement, powerful political forces within the EU
Parliament, as well as important EU member states, might not find this view acceptable.
If the latter is the case, ratification of the accession treaties might be endangered, and the
planned IGC meeting in 2004 automatically would gain a decisive role in making the
EU institutionally fit for Eastern enlargement.44 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
1. An Organization in Flux
Without apparent intention, the EU provides an extreme and living example of the Tibetan
Buddhist thesis of “impermanence” (Dalai Lama, 1992). Since its inception in the early
1950s, the EU continuously has undertaken institutional and organizational change as its
goals were altered periodically in order to make progress toward the underlying dream of
European unity. With the twenty-first century now underway, the highest conceivable
stage of EU development is still not clearly envisaged. Such visionaries as Robert Schu-
mann and Jean Monnet conceived and articulated visions of a Europe “united,” but the
specific form or forms it should take was left—and continues to remain—open.
Throughout the year 2000, during the preparations for the Nice Summit, flagrant in-
stitutional problems were recognized and dealt with in fiery debates. Such discussions
also covered the issue of the finalité of the form the Union ultimately would take.
Nearly every European leader had his or her two cents to offer, starting with Germany’s
Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, who delivered a passionate speech in May 2000 to an
audience at Berlin’s Humboldt University.
14 Despite some differences in detail, most of
the German concepts favor a federal Europe with well-defined institutions and compe-
tencies. The French proposals follow more the concept of a “core Europe,” whereas the
British view favors a looser confederation of European states. Some of the issues raised
in delivered speeches are addressed below, but what is important for us as economists to
consider is that over the decades the EU’s economic character has altered fundamentally
and will continue to do so.
Economically, the European Union has changed from a custom union to a common
market to an organization of states many of whose members are linked by monetary
union. But not only the stages of integration changed but also the level of economic di-
vergence. Once the EU was characterized rightly as a “rich-man’s club” composed of
advanced West European economies. With Ireland’s entry into the EU in 1973, Greece’s
entry in 1981 and Portugal and Spain’s entries in 1986, the EU changed somewhat as it
incorporated countries that for some years would be known as Europe’s “poor four.” We
predict that the next two rounds of expansion will be much more challenging in com-
parison. The population of the EU is expected to increase by nearly thirty percent with
Eastern enlargement. However, total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the EU is not
expected to increase more than a mere five percent. A significant increase in population,
coupled with but a marginal increase in output, spells relative declines in the EU’s GDP
per capita. The EU is going to look poorer—much poorer—at least statistically. After
accession, a decade or more will be required to raise its per capita GDP back to its pre-
enlargement level. And this statement assumes that the EU economies respond posi-
tively enough to enlargement to raise economic-growth rates.
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We do not anticipate that any citizen of the existing member states would become
poorer as a result of Eastern enlargement. However, indirect effects, such as those
stemming from higher budgetary contributions and/or lower transfer sums from Brus-
sels, should have some effect on a country's level of wealth. To meet the challenges of
such an unprecedented enlargement, the European Commission should make policies
that help the organization run more effectively. The important task for the accession
countries is to adopt and faithfully implement the Acquis Communautaire, the vast set
of rules and regulations adopted by all existing EU member countries.
Was sufficient groundwork laid at the summits in Berlin and Nice? As we have pre-
sented in Section III, the results of both summits fell short, representing only the mini-
mum level of changes needed to cope financially with the challenge of incorporating
five or possibly eight CEECs before the end of fiscal year (FY) 2006. Starting in FY
2007, the financial requirements for dealing with Eastern enlargement appear to be far
greater than the funds the EU would have at its disposal. Therefore, the EU must for-
mulate a new set of policy reforms that could be approved and integrated as “Agenda
2007.” This is necessary to provide the EU with a framework for successfully dealing
with the additional financial obligations it will face as a result of Eastern enlargement.
We advise that parts of Agenda 2007 should be formulated and approved at the inter-
governmental summit scheduled for 2004 (Quaisser and Hall, 2001). "Summit 2004"
should specify and clarify the competencies of the different administrative levels of the
EU, whether they be Europeanwide, national or regional. In addition, it should initiate
the process of introducing major reforms needed in preparation for Agenda 2007. We
will deal with some major aspects of Summit 2004 in Chapter V.
2. Decision Making: Voting Power and Finance
In addition to the deficits mentioned above, the results of the Nice Summit and the re-
lated fear of exploding costs are especially worrisome for net payers into Brussels’s
budget. A country such as Germany has been willing in the past to assume growing bur-
den shares as a way to support a more thorough European integration, and thus to pro-
mote peace and stability on Europe’s continent. Unfortunately, the Nice Summit did
little to dispel fears of exploding costs.
Though majority voting was extended at the Nice Summit, Spain was able to veto
any changes that might alter the financing of structural policies until the start of FY
2007. Spain also expressed an unwillingness to accept cuts in the levels of transfers it
receives. In fact, the political power of the net payers into the EU's budget did not
change for the better with Nice. Following the Banzhaf Index, which estimates the rela-
tive voting power wielded by different parties engaged in various votes, only one out of
2,500 times would Germany, with its sizeable population, be brought into a better vot-
ing position as a result of the Nice Summit (Kirsch, 2001).
15 The Netherlands is another
net payer that received no measurable change in its real voting power. From the per-
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spective of net payers, there is a massive discrepancy between their relative share of
funding for the EU budget and the relative levels of political voting power they wield.
Additionally, under the existing system of decision making, the move toward including
twenty-five or more members of the Union would reduce dramatically the likelihood
that a qualified majority in coalitions needed for important decisions could be achieved.
Hence, political paralysis is expected to be a real danger for the enlarged Union (Kirsch,
2001; Baldwin et al., 2000).
If we consider an enlarged EU with up to twenty-seven members by 2008, then the
net payers would constitute an estimated 62.6 percent of the EU's projected total popu-
lation. This 62.6 percent would contribute 81.4 percent to the total EU budget. How-
ever, following the Nice Summit results, this group would wield but 45.5 percent of the
EU's voting power according to the Banzhaf Index. The discrepancy between net budg-
etary contributions and voting power is especially great for the largest contributors, as
their influence is disproportionately and significantly less, especially when compared to
the net receivers in the accession countries. Although a qualified majority of votes
(71.42 percent) and a single majority of states is needed in making important EU deci-
sions, the relatively large weights of net-receiver countries could result in their voting
higher levels of funding for themselves (see Table 10). Fortunately, a form of safeguard
clause exists that ensures that a majority decision in the council also represents the ma-
jority of the EU population (Wessels, 2001).
TABLE 10
Major Indicators and Voting Power in EU-27
(Projected for FY 2008, Expressed as Percent of a Projected
Average of Twenty-Seven Members)
Groups of Countries* Population EU’s GDP Budget Votes--Nice Banzhaf
High Net Payers 23.94 32.24 33.65 17.97 17.93
Medium Net Payers 38.65 49.13 46.59 29.28 27.54
Medium Net Recipients EU-15 13.25 11.94 12.63 16.81 16.99
High Net Recipients EU-15 2.25 1.58 1.79 4.64 4.97
Medium Net Recipients
Accession Countries 4.42 1.42 1.54 9.86 10.64
High Net Recipients
Accession Countries 17.49 3.70 3.80 21.45 21.93
* High net payers contribute more than 0.3 percent of their GNPs. These include Germany, the Nether-
lands, Sweden and Austria.  Medium net payers contribute up to 0.3 percent of their GNPs. This group
includes Denmark, France, Italy, Finland and the United Kingdom. Medium net recipients of EU-15 funds
receive up to three percent of their GNPs. This group includes Belgium, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. High
net recipients in the EU-15 receive more than three percent of their GNPs. These include Greece and
Luxembourg. Medium net-recipient accession countries that will receive up to three percent of their GNPs
likely will include Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia. High net-recipient
accession countries receiving over three percent of their GNPs are expected to include Poland, Estonia,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania.
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The danger of additional cost explosions is especially high because EU policies in-
herited from the past were more the results of political compromise than sound or even
moderately rational decision making. Agricultural policy emerged more or less as a con-
cession to French and German farmers, so that they would support European integration
in the first place. Structural policy was initiated by the demands of the United Kingdom
and Ireland when they entered the Union, and the spirit of these policies was extended
generously when the Southern countries joined in the 1980s. Each phase of enlargement
made EU policies that much more subject to political pressures, and consequently that
much more expensive. This was especially obvious when the Southern countries of
Greece, Spain and Portugal joined. Shaped by political pressures, many EU policies are
too outmoded for the organization to deal effectively with challenges raised by Eastern
enlargement. We fear that a form of horse-trading likely will increase in the coming
years as a way to decide the fates of major cost-intensive policy issues.
3. Reform of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
There is a broad consensus among economists, other academics and now even among
some everyday consumers that the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is too
costly and leads to an inefficient allocation of resources. Close to fifty percent of the EU
budget goes to fund the CAP. Subsidizing agricultural prices is known to promote over-
production. As a result, EU surpluses are either destroyed or are sold as commodities on
the world market at prices below the costs of production. Such dumping is known to
generate trade frictions between and among EU member countries, as well as between
the EU and other countries, and trade blocs such as NAFTA. In addition, the CAP es-
tablishes quotas for sugar and includes set-aside programs for farmland.
Highly intensive agricultural production historically has required copious amounts of
fertilizers and pesticides—some of which have proved to be detrimental to rural flora,
fauna, soil and water systems involving rivers, lakes and estuaries. What is more, CAP
price subsidies have a known tendency to benefit large-scale producers and also keep
marginal farmers in production. Such farmers earn meager farm incomes and often have
to work a second job in town.
In spite of its excesses and deficiencies, Europe’s CAP has proven remarkably resis-
tant to any attempts at substantial reform (Ehrke, 2001). Although Agenda 2000 reduces
funds for price supports, while placing more emphasis on direct income supports for
farmers, the tendency for market distortions still exists. Hence, further CAP reforms
should aim to foster the establishment of unfettered market prices for agricultural prod-
ucts. Reforms should delink direct payments to farmers from their productive capacity
and reduce the amount of subsidies. In addition, CAP reforms should introduce national
cofinancing for farm-income support. Such reforms are necessary not only to make EU
agriculture more efficient but also to prepare the Union for Eastern enlargement. The
Berlin Summit in March of 1999 did not exhibit the foresight to provide any expendi-
tures for direct payments to CEEC farmers in its financial plan.48 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
There were some rational arguments behind this decision. According to current CAP
rules, income-support measures are paid to EU farmers who suffer from price decreases.
Since CEEC farmers can expect to gain from agricultural-price increases as their coun-
tries join the Union, there is no real need for special compensation. However, it is not
only political arguments (like the second-class status the CEECs might take on) that
make it difficult for EU member states to avoid paying direct income-support measures.
As these payments are still linked to the scale of production on farms (land and number
of animals), they in fact will have a distorting effect on competition if farmers in the
CEECs are not integrated into this system. However, accession countries should bear in
mind that the existing EU income-support scheme will have negative effects on their
countries as well. First of all, it will change the income distribution in favor of the rural
population and owners of farms. In addition, those farms might not profit because the
use and ownership of agricultural land is widely dispersed in the CEECs.
If such reforms are introduced in the near future—and then are executed consistently
without giving in to political pressures—the EU should be able to incorporate the acces-
sion countries’ agriculture into its income-support system (Schrader, 2000). The EU
then should extend financial assistance to the new member countries to promote struc-
tural changes in agriculture and further rural development.  Such a program, with its
progressive bent, would make much more economic sense than merely keeping marginal
farmers in production.
There is no lack of innovative concepts for improving EU agricultural policy (Urff,
1997).
16 What has been lacking is the political will to implement them. Nevertheless,
several political factors exist that may help promote CAP reforms. For one, France is
starting to recognize that it will become a substantial net payer if enlargement costs are
excessive.
However, this situation is complicated by the fact that the overall net financial posi-
tion of each country is determined largely by net positions regarding their agricultural
and structural funds. Between 1995 and 1999, France exhibited a positive financial bal-
ance in agricultural funds of about 1.9 billion euros (0.16 percent of its GDP) annually,
and Germany a negative balance of 5.3 billion (0.27 percent of its GDP; see Table 11).
If, in the future, a larger portion of agricultural supports is nationally cofinanced, France
is likely to lose relatively more and Germany to gain. However, France’s net position,
also in agriculture, should take a change for the worse even if the CEECs are integrated
following the existing income-support system. France might be willing to promote a
CAP reform if it is offered a medium-term phasing-out scheme. That might diminish the
political pressure from the agricultural lobby not only in France but also in other mem-
ber states.
Negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO) also might place pressure
on the EU to enact deeper agricultural reforms (Anderson, 2000). The results of these
negotiations not only will force the EU to reduce price and export subsidies but also will
press for delinking income-support measures from the amount of land and numbers of
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animals. Finally, after the elections scheduled to take place in 2002, France and Ger-
many will be free to work together to overcome the blockades to reforms they have sur-
reptitiously and not so surreptitiously encouraged in recent decades. Signs of commonly
held positions already have been observed, but a real breakthrough would be possible
only after the 2002 elections.
TABLE 11
Net Financial Position of Selected EU Member States
in EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
Annual Average Between 1995 and 1999 in Billions of Euros and Percent
of Member Country’s GDP
Net Position: “contribution to own
resources”
1
Net Position: “member state’s con-
tribution to the budget”
2
in billions/euro in % of GDP in billions/euro in % of GDP
France 2.502 0.20 1.971 0.16
Germany -4.967 -0.26 -5.239 -0.27
Great Britain -1.272 -0.11 -0.669 -0.06
Spain 2.158 0.43 2.009 0.40
1 Calculation of the net position is based on each country’s contribution to the EU’s own resources—i.e.,
according to its share in EU’s GDP. 
2 Calculation of the net position is based on each country’s real con-
tribution to the EU’s budget.
Sources: Weise et al., 2001; authors’ calculations
So long as serious reform measures are avoided, the CAP promises to remain a
source of conflict among the EU's existing fifteen member states. One of the problems
associated with current negotiations is that it is unclear what sort of CAP will exist
when new members enter the EU. The current EU member states should press for rapid
reforms, because once the CEECs are part of the EU, they might prefer not to undertake
agricultural reforms at home but instead to live from the CAP’s largesse. The recent
BSE crisis provides yet another opportunity to reform the CAP, as the EU’s agricultural
lobby with its powerful meat industry is under attack as never before. Political pressures
by consumers are increasing (Ehrke, 2001), and important reform measures likely will
be introduced during the EU’s review of agricultural policy planned for 2002 and 2003.
Over the next few years, one of the possible outcomes of reform discussions will be
that CAP policies will be altered to consider environmental externalities more seriously.
However, the danger is that such changes might lead to yet more bureaucratic regula-
tions, this time in the name of “environmental safeguards.” If implemented, these “re-
forms” might mean that European agriculture fails to improve its international competi-50 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
tiveness, thus leaving intact the hefty financial burden to the EU budget. In addition, it
has yet to be established scientifically that bureaucratic regulations concerning ecologi-
cal farming would lead to better environmental results than would less-intensive forms
of conventional agriculture.
A favorable opportunity to push ahead with substantial reforms involving the so-
called “second pillar” of the CAP could result from the CAP’s “mid-term review” in
2002. This program dedicated to rural development is cofinanced by national and re-
gional governments on an optional basis and at the moment amounts to about ten per-
cent of agricultural expenditures. If it continues without changing, its costs would bur-
den national budgets, but if its cofinancing becomes mandatory for countries—as op-
posed to optional—it would offer a degree of financial relief to the EU’s net payers.
4. Reform of Structural and Regional Policy
The structural policy of the EU faces mounting criticism. Doubts have been raised as to
whether it effectively has, over the years, promoted economic convergence among EU
regions. The second report on “cohesion” by the European Commission indicates only
limited success in the convergence of the Union's regional per capita incomes (EU
Commission, 2001b). Between 1988 and 1998, per capita incomes of the poorest areas,
which included about twenty-five percent of the EU’s population, increased only
slightly, from sixty-six to sixty-eight percent of the EU’s average. According to the EU
Commission’s Report 2001 (EU Commission, 2001b), regional disparities in per capita
incomes declined only marginally in the 1988 to 1998 time period, whereas the disparity
in rates of unemployment increased substantially (Wegner, 2001). One might argue that
without the existing structural policies these figures probably would be even more dis-
parate. Nevertheless, to date structural policy scarcely could be called an EU success
story (Boldrin, Canova, 2001).
While regional disparities remain a problem, progress has been made toward conver-
gence in national-income levels. Between 1988 and 1998, poorer countries like Spain,
Greece and Portugal increased their average levels of national per capita income from
sixty-eight to seventy-nine percent of the EU average. European Commission model
simulations from 1997 have suggested that the EU’s cohesion policy might have con-
tributed to this increase. However, a solid economic evaluation would have to consider
the welfare losses caused by higher rates of payments into Brussels’s budget made by
net-payer countries in order to finance the transfers.
Most impressive is the catching-up process exhibited by Ireland. In 1973, when it
joined the European Economic Community, Ireland’s per capita income was but sixty
percent of the EU average. Through its years of output growth, especially 1987 to 2000,
and its population’s historic pattern of out migration, Ireland has raised its per capita
GDP (in purchasing-power standards) to about twenty percent above the EU average
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land’s rapid growth especially in the technology sector, qualified labor began returning
to the country.
In contrast, Greece's economic development has remained as disappointing as it was
before it joined the community in 1983 (Dauderstädt, 2001a). As recently as 1998,
Greece exhibited a GDP per capita that was but fifty-five percent of the EU average, and
Greece's consumers benefited from a purchasing-power standard that was but seventy
percent of the EU average. More recently, accompanying a shift in Greece's economic
policy, some positive trends in economic growth and stability are starting to show. In
January of 2001, Greece entered the euro zone, even though its economy remains
plagued by a host of problems, including an entrenched tradition of corruption that crip-
ples its movement toward modern economic growth (Boltho, 2000).
From an economic standpoint, EU regional policy should concentrate on funding the
production of public goods where it is deemed necessary. Fund transfers designed to
foster successful economic transitions within the EU’s internal market also would be
economically justifiable. In addition, such transfers would help to mitigate whatever
social tensions might arise. If markets fail and negative externalities occur, then public-
sector interventions would appear to be both rational and socially responsible (Mal-
lossek, 1999).
From this perspective, it does not seem reasonable that the EU should assign nearly
thirty-five percent of its budget to structural funds. However, the thrust of EU policy
goes well beyond such economic arguments. In fact, its structural policy is designed as a
form of redistribution scheme between and among richer and poorer member states.
Even more than “structural funds,” the term “cohesion fund” underscores the overriding
political purpose of the transfers. To date, large sums of such funds were given to Ire-
land and the Southern countries of Greece, Portugal and Spain. But what makes this
policy instrument suspect is the fact that member states with higher per capita incomes
also receive sizeable shares. Approximately fifty percent of the EU’s population lives in
areas supported by these funds.
In the financial period 1994-99, France and Germany received about twenty-three
percent of all structural funds. Once established, this type of financial redistribution has
a strong tendency to be subject to political horse-trading that continues to persist even
when its original purpose is outdated. There is a deep-seated tendency for every benefi-
ciary country to attempt to optimize its funding. Axt (2000) describes this system cor-
rectly, as a trap of interlinked interests. This kind of policymaking could be described as
a form of political bargaining (also called a “system of concordance”) aimed at harmo-
nizing interests and dividing them proportionately. Structural funds also could be con-
sidered as side payments to “buy” political decisions in fields essential to other net-
payer member countries. This makes it extremely difficult to succeed with any substan-
tial changes within the system.
Spain and Ireland, for example, are clear beneficiaries of this laxness. During former
enlargements of the EU, a misallocation of funds could be shouldered readily by the
prosperous member states. This will not be the case with Eastern enlargement, as there
will be a major redirection of massive financial flows that cannot be borne by more52 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
prosperous member states without noticeable losses. However, if the extensive rules
governing the distribution of these funds were strictly applied, the financial implications
would not be placed above the overriding motivation to alter structural policy. We might
illustrate this with the example of the most important structural-policy instrument—
“objective-one” funding.
“Objective-one” funding is transferred to regions with per capita GDPs (measured in
purchasing-power standards) below seventy-five percent of the EU average. With East-
ern enlargement, the EU regions that currently appear poor will be made to appear sta-
tistically richer as the average level of per capita GDP across an enlarged Union falls.
About twenty-seven regions with approximately forty-nine million inhabitants will face
losing their transfers because their regional GDP levels will rise above the seventy-five-
percent line. At the same time, the number of inhabitants below this line would increase
from seventy-one million to 174 million persons, that is, to about thirty-six percent of
the enlarged EU’s population. If the Union accepts Spain’s recent proposal to retain the
existing levels of structural and cohesion policies in the enlarged EU, Brussels expen-
ditures would increase to a level that would be wholly unmanageable. Moreover, the
new member states would get much less per capita funding than the earlier beneficiaries
of cohesion funds. Consequently, we propose that all EU members, both rich and poor,
redirect their assistance funds to foster growth in accession countries.
There is another point to be stressed. After accession, fulfilling the goal of the Un-
ion's structural policy—to promote economic convergence and diminish income dis-
parities between EU regions—will be harder to achieve. In spite of the rosy picture
painted in neoclassical theory (namely, that factor incomes will tend to equalize through
integration), the EU still faces substantial inequalities that we expect to linger even over
the long term.
In addition, because agglomeration effects tend to be strong, an enlarged EU will
change from its present characterization as a “rich-man's club” to that of a heterogene-
ous collection of countries characterized by a sizeable East-West development gap. As
the EU’s structural policy shifts away from supporting less-developed regions, it should
concentrate more on promoting the convergence of member countries. Regional policy
emerges as one of the defined competencies of each EU member state, while criteria for
structural and cohesion funds are reformed and altered so that such funds are reallocated
toward poorer member countries.
17
That is to say, the reforms should give member states greater control over the choice
of investment projects. But to avoid misuse, EU-wide standards for the allocation of
funds should be designed and administered consistently. The Commission, with its ten-
dency to become overloaded by administrative details, should be freed from the ex-ante
selection of projects and should concentrate instead on ex-post evaluations. This is espe-
cially important because the commission will have to take over the responsibilities for
steering and controlling policy in the new member states. If a misuse of money is
proved, sanctions could be implemented, i.e., a country would have to repay funds and
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would also be penalized by being allocated less money for the next financial period. We
suggest that a larger part of allocated funds should be given in the form of preferential
credits (or with a greater share cofinanced) and within the framework of international
banking institutions, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) or the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
Funds should be distributed among member states according to their national GDP
per capita, measured in terms of purchasing-power standards (PPS). We suggest that the
maximum amount of funds be fixed in advance and presented as an absolute sum or
specified percentage of either the EU budget or total EU GDP. In support of Eastern
enlargement, EU structural policy should concentrate on the lowest-income countries
among the new member states. Such a concentration is justified by the fact that the
poorer the country, the greater the adjustment costs connected with structural change.
5. Financial Redistribution and Budgetary Reforms
In outlining a new framework for the European budget, our starting point is to calculate
the net financial positions relative to the EU budget of such large EU countries as
France, Germany, Spain and Great Britain, plus the future EU state Poland. Because of
their relatively large sizes, France and Germany currently play comparatively important
roles in the process of European integration. France is a medium net receiver of EU
transfers, whereas Germany is a substantial net payer. Politically and economically,
Spain is the most powerful of the EU’s net-receiver countries, with strong aspirations to
stay in this position. Great Britain, while exhibiting strong reservations toward further
EU integration, demonstrates a more liberal approach toward existing EU economic
policy. In addition, former prime minister Margaret Thatcher was able to achieve a re-
markable degree of relief for Britain's budgetary position.
Of the new member states, we expect that Poland readily will establish itself as the
most powerful, articulating specific interests and concerns—especially related to agri-
cultural policy—which well may generate some real headaches for Brussels. Assuming
that a first accession round takes place at the latest in 2005 and includes Poland, we ex-
pect that the latter country will emerge as a major political player in the budgetary deci-
sions over the financial period 2007-2013.
In discussing budgetary reform, two particularly important questions emerge.  First,
how will the net financial positions of major EU member states change under plausible
reform options? Second, which financial scenarios are selected countries likely to
choose? We shall consider the four scenarios presented above: the unchanged political
bargaining, high cost, status quo EU-27 calculated by the DIW and status quo EU-15
calculated by the DIW (see chapter III, 2.2. and Lippert, Bode, 2001). In addition, we
shall present two reform scenarios calculated by the DIW, plus our own proposal. To
facilitate calculations, we assume that EU enlargement involving all candidate countries
(except Cyprus and Malta for data reasons) will be completed by 2007.54 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
The DIW’s first reform proposal—which it calls “moderate reforms”—predicts that
the income level qualifying regions for structural-fund payments, within “objective-one”
funding, would be increased from seventy-five to up to eighty-six percent of the EU’s
average GDP measured in purchasing-power standards (PPS). Agricultural policy still
would be based on direct income payments, but would have to be cofinanced by national
budgets. This means that EU agricultural expenditures could decline in relative and ab-
solut terms.
In the radical reform scenario proposed by the DIW, structural policy is designed in
such a way that structural-funds payments will be directed not to regions but to those
countries with a per capita GDP level below eighty-five percent of the EU average. For
agricultural policy, direct income payments would be delinked from the means of pro-
duction (such as scale of production and technical level) and, eventually, totally abol-
ished. In order to diminish the adjustment pressures, each of these options would have
transitional periods that should end at the same time as the next financial planning pe-
riod. Hence, 2007 and 2013 are our reference years.
We begin our analysis by discussing the real situation in 1997 and the projected one
for 2002. With the 1999 Berlin decisions, the net financial positions of Germany, Great
Britain and Spain improved between 1997 and 2002, whereas that of France deterio-
rated. These differences partly reflect changes in the distribution of structural-fund ex-
penditures (calculated using a clearly defined formula), as well as changes in the correc-
tion mechanism for the “British rebate.” The latter was introduced in order to reduce the
budgetary imbalances of high net-payer countries like Germany, Austria and the Neth-
erlands (see Agenda 2000b). In applying the Berlin decision of Agenda 2000 strictly to
old and new members (meaning that East European farmers would receive no direct
payments), the results are the following: in 2007 Poland would receive about 2.48 per-
cent of its net GDP, while in 2013 this level would increase moderately to 2.63 percent.
The net financial positions of current EU member states would decline, though Spain
would remain a net receiver of EU transfers.
Comparing this scenario with the situation without enlargement allows us to deter-
mine the net cost of enlargement for single member countries. It turns out that France
would suffer the most significant losses in its net financial position (minus 0.19 per-
cent), followed by Germany (minus 0.17 percent) and Spain (minus 0.14 percent). The
United Kingdom would be much better off, as the “British rebate” reduces its net en-
largement costs to 0.06 percent of its GDP. We believe, however, that this rebate is un-
fair to other EU members—especially with respect to enlargement costs—because it
reduces the relative burden of Britain's funding of the EU budget. The substantial cor-
rections that should be made will be easier to achieve once major agricultural reforms
are implemented.
In all other scenarios presented in Table 12, the contribution of single member coun-
tries to the EU budget corresponds to their relative shares in the EU’s overall GDP. This
seems justified because the importance of all other sources of the EU budget, such as
tariffs and parts of the value-added tax, is expected to diminish over time. In addition,
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would not survive for too long. Consequently, the relative sizes of the GDPs of single
member countries increasingly would determine their net budget contributions.
Comparing the years 2007 and 2013, the DIW status quo EU-15 scenario demon-
strates that even without enlargement Spain would experience a net decline of 0.43 per-
cent of its projected GDP in 2013. This lowering of the projected GDP would result
mainly from the expected convergence process, which would lead to fewer transfers of
structural-fund payments to Spain. Spain would remain a net receiver, but by 2013 those
receipts would decline to approximately 0.88 percent of its annual net GDP. This point
is important because Spain would not be in the position to bargain over its reduced
transfer payments. By contrast, the status quo EU-15 scenario demonstrates that France
(plus 0.04 percent of GDP), Germany  (plus 0.08 percent) and the UK (plus 0.09 per-
cent) would improve their net financial positions between 2007 and 2013. France would
become a net receiver of EU funds and Germany and the UK would remain net payers,
though they would contribute no more than 0.25 percent of their GDPs to Brussels’s
budget. What is most important in comparing the DIW scenarios status quo EU-15
(without enlargement) and status quo EU-27 (with enlargement, including direct pay-
ments to East European farmers at current levels) is the fact that with enlargement Spain
is slated to lose relatively more (minus 0.72 percent by 2013) than the net-payer coun-
tries, which would be losing between minus 0.22 and minus 0.25 percent of their annual
projected GDPs. This is because with enlargement the average per capita GDP would
decline for the EU as a whole, and most of the Spanish regions then would not qualify
for current levels of structural funds. As a new member state, Poland would receive
about net 4.7 percent of its GDP annually from 2007 to 2013.
In our “unchanged political bargaining” and “high cost” scenarios (which are, in fact,
very similar), the higher enlargement costs (compared to the DIW scenarios) would lead
to a substantial deterioration of the net positions of existing member states. Still, the
costs would be much more equally shared among countries, with the exception of the
UK. However, it is unlikely that in 2013 France and the UK would accept a net financial
position of minus 0.47 percent, or minus 0.42 percent of their respective GDPs, or that
Germany would accept paying 0.73 of its net GDP to Brussels. Spain would lose slightly
more than Germany and France but would retain a much better net position (plus 0.88
percent) than in the DIW status quo scenarios. Clearly it would be in the interests of
Germany, the UK and even France to apply strictly the Berlin rules for distribution of
funds, and not to play an “unchanged political bargaining game” as in the earlier finan-
cial period. For Poland, as a new member state, the situation appears more promising in
our scenario, with that country’s economy exhibiting growth rates of four percent of its
annual GDP. However, Poland's preference might not be so clear because it also would
be a substantial net receiver in the DIW status quo scenarios. Since it would not change
its net position substantially, Poland might opt for a strict application of existing EU
rules, which also would take into consideration the interests of other important EU part-
ners such as Germany and France.
Compared to the status quo EU-27 scenario, France would be slightly worse off un-
der both the moderate and the radical reform DIW scenarios mainly because of reduced
agricultural funds (where France traditionally has exhibited large surpluses). Interest-56 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
ingly, however, France would be better off with the radical reform approach than with
the moderate one mainly because of the radical approach’s overall reduced EU expen-
ditures, which would decrease France’s contribution as a net payer to the EU budget.
Spain would gain in the moderate reform option largely because structural-funds pay-
ments would be reduced at a slower pace than in the status quo. Spain, however, clearly
would lose in the radical reform approach, eventually turning into a net payer in 2013.
Consequently, it is unlikely that Spain would vote for the radical option. In contrast,
Germany and the United Kingdom would improve their net financial positions more
dramatically with the radical reform approach, while Poland’s net financial position
would deteriorate slightly in both reform scenarios. However, Poland is more likely to
oppose the radical reform option, especially those aspects of it (such as agricultural co-
financing) that require it to assume additional financial burdens.
Our starting point for creating an improved financial system for EU budget allocation is
the belief that, even in the DIW’s radical reform approach, there is much room left for
political bargaining about the overall amount of expenditures as well as "side" payments.
One important consideration is that the design of transitional arrangements for agricultural
and structural funding is primarily a political decision. Secondly, de la Fuente and
Doménch (2001) showed in regression calculations that the degree of redistribution among
member states (related to the net budget positions and per capita GDPs in PPS) was not
equal in the past. To put it another way: Why does Ireland receive (in net terms) much
more per capita related to its national wealth than does Spain, and why are Germany and
the Netherlands much higher net payers than France and Denmark? As it turns out, these
disparities would not be eliminated by the DIW reform proposals. Figure 2 shows that in
2013 the correlation coefficient between per capita income and net financial transfers per
capita in the DIW scenario is very low (0.285) and still remains low (0.647) if we do not
consider Great Britain (see Figure 2).
18 This suggests the unequal treatment toward differ-
ent countries when considering income levels measured as GDP per capita.
This leads us to propose a fundamental reform of the EU financial system, a reform
based on horizontal financial redistribution among member countries. Funds should be
distributed according to countries’ national GDP per capita, measured in terms of pur-
chasing-power standards (PPS). Basing our ideas on the proposals of Mallosek (1999),
we suggest that the maximum amount of funds be fixed in advance and presented either
as a lump sum or as a specified percentage of either the EU budget or total EU GDP.
This would represent a major political step, which should be taken at an intergovern-
mental conference in 2005. Two possibilities related to this decision need to be consid-
ered: one, to adopt this procedure only for structural-funds payments and treat spending
in the agricultural sector separately or, two, to use this method for the distribution of
overall spending, in the form of agricultural and structural expenditures. However, to
support Eastern enlargement, EU funds should be concentrated on the lowest-income
countries among the newly admitted accession states. Such a concentration is justified
                                                
18 Great Britain’s fiscal imbalance is corrected by the British rebate, which was not considered in the
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by the fact that the poorer the country, the greater the adjustment costs connected with
structural change.
FIGURE 2
Relative Net Financial Position Per Capita vs. Per Capita Incomes
in the Radical DIW Reform Scenario
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Sources: Weise et al., 2001; authors' calculations
To present our new financial scheme in detail: At the beginning of the financial pe-
riod in 2007, the overall amount of structural funds should be set at a level of 0.35 per-
cent of the EU's GDP. This is the level established until 2004, when enlargement is to
begin. The amount of structural funds calculated for 2007—about thirty-seven billion
euros—should stay constant in absolute terms for the whole financial period from 2007
to 2013. This would reflect the political decision to reduce structural spending over
time, because GDP growth should cause the share of structural funds to shrink to 0.30
percent of the EU's GDP. The structural-fund payments would be distributed recipro-
cally based on the ranking of per capita GDP (measured in PPS) among member states
in each financial year. Hence, the distribution of funds would alter following changes in
this ranking. To determine the funds for each country, a special “distribution factor”
(DF) would be calculated to represent the differences between the EU per capita GDP
average and the per capita GDP of individual member countries. For example, Poland’s
per capita GDP would amount around fourty-nine percent lower than the EU average
and Germany’s twenty-eight percent higher (the DFs then would be 2.04 for Poland and
0.78 for Germany). Having thus calculated the DFs, we would be able to determine the
absolute amount of funds to be distributed among member states.
19
                                                
19 The absolute amount of funding is determined by the following formula: Funds country i = (pop i ×
DF i) × (funds tot/pop tot). Funds country i = the funding for country i; pop = population of country i;
DF i = distribution factor of country i; funds tot = fixed amount of total structural fund spending; pop tot =
total population of the EU.58 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
The DF also could be adjusted to fit the desired slope of the redistribution curve. To
allocate more funds to new member states, we could use the square of the DF. This,
however, would lead to disproportionately large funding of poorer countries, caused by
the exacerbated differences in per capita GDPs. Even using the normal DF would lead
to transfer payments to Bulgaria of more than twenty percent of that country’s GDP.
Therefore, we should consider other options. We could, for example, fix spending at the
already existing cap of four percent of GDP—the threshold for absorption capacity al-
ready determined by the EU. We also could choose a flatter redistribution rate. If we opt
for a flatter curve while also using the square root of the DF, this would lead to higher
levels of funds being calculated for existing member states. In fact, for the poorer mem-
ber states the four-percent cap or ceiling still would be required. For agricultural funding
we use the amounts calculated on a yearly basis in the DIW radical reform scenario.
Overall agricultural expenditures amounting to 0.46 percent of the EU's GDP would
shrink to 0.26 percent, adjusted to our price basis of around thirty-two billion euros. The
distribution of agricultural expenditures is given by the DIW scenario. In fact, overall
spending in agricultural and structural spending would shrink between 2007 and 2013
from 0.81 to 0.57 percent of the EU's annual GDP.
The results of these calculations are presented in Table 12, in the category “New Fi-
nancial System, plus Agriculture” (NFSA). Under the NFSA scenario, net-payer coun-
tries would be better off than under other scenarios, with the exception of status quo
EU-15. In addition, Spain would gain compared to the DIW’s radical reform scenario,
with its net position in 2013 estimated at nearly 0.2 percent of GDP. However, Poland’s
net position under the NFSA is expected to change for the worse compared to most
other scenarios, mainly because of the flat redistribution rate. From an estimated 3.02
percent of GDP in 2007, it is expected to decline to 2.02 percent in 2013. Hence, Poland
might oppose this distribution scheme, although it would be no worse off than under the
Berlin Agenda scenario. With the proposed redistribution rate, substantial transfers
amounting to more than sixty percent of the EU budget would be retained for the old
EU-15 member states. However, nearly five billion euros would be saved in 2007 and
around two billion between 2007 and 2013 by setting funding for new members Bul-
garia, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania at a five-percent ceiling that includes agricultural
spending. These savings could be used for additional spending outside the EU, i.e., di-
rected toward a stability pact with strategic partners beyond the EU’s borders.
Nevertheless, the scenario presented above clearly exhibits some shortcomings, in ad-
dition to those related to Poland's likely opposition. Although the distribution problems are
mitigated, the existing imbalances in agricultural expenditures still would lead to an un-
even distribution of funds and hence to a not transparent determination of the net financial
position of each member country (see Fig. 2). To avoid this problem, we could use the DF
for the distribution of total expenditures, which are fixed at the same amounts as in the
NFSA scenario. In this new NFSR (New Financial System, Redistribution) scenario,
France and Spain would lose relative to the NFSA scenario, whereas Germany, the UK
and Poland would gain. Given these unequal results, reforming the EU’s financial system
in the direction of greater transparency will require implementing bold decisions.Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement 59
TABLE 12
Projected Net Budgetary Positions of Selected EU Member States and of Poland
 (in Percentage of GNP or GDP; Years 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2013)

















































































































































1 in percentage of GNP; 
2 Berlin calculation without enlargement; 
3 unchanged-political-bargaining sce-
nario. All assumptions behind the calculations are explained in the text.
Sources: authors' calculations; Agenda 2000 (2000b); Weise et al., 2001
Behind our recommendation to reduce spending on agriculture and structural funds
by following a transparent horizontal redistribution mechanism is the firm belief that
CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) and structural policy should be abolished in their
existing forms and limited to regulatory supervision of national programs. The overall
savings in agricultural and structural spending offer additional room for national gov-
ernments to set their own priorities in regional and agricultural policy. Such priorities,
however, would have to conform to the rules and legislation of the EU, especially in the60 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
field of competition. With the expected savings, the EU also could increase its spending
on such vital issues as improving internal and external security, promoting EU-wide
programs to improve the functioning of its internal market and monetary union, ad-
vancing EU-related education programs, and offering economic support to strategic
partners outside the EU.
FIGURE 3
Relative Net Financial Position Per Capita vs. Per Capita Incomes
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6. Reforming the Central European Bank (ECB)
With accession, the new EU member states will have not only the possibility but also
the long-term commitment to join the European Monetary Union (EMU)—provided
they fulfill the Maastricht criteria. In signing the protocol for EU membership, the
CEECs will be obliged to enter the EMU and will not be offered the choice of opting
out like Denmark and Britain. Most of the potential accession countries already have
achieved the Maastricht criteria with respect to their public debts and budget deficits.
However, the fiscal situation remains fragile in some countries (see the current budget
crisis in Poland) and the definitions of “public debt” and “budget deficit” may still differ
within the EU and the CEECs. Additionally, some CEECs exhibit inflation and interest
rates that are out of line with Maastricht. It also remains highly questionable whether
most accession countries could reach sufficient levels of stability with regard to their
national-currency exchange rates within a ERM-II framework (see Table 13).
Nevertheless, most of the accession countries already have achieved a remarkable
degree of macroeconomic stability. This could be illustrated by comparing their situa-
tion with that of the Southern EU member countries in 1990 and 1991, before the
Maastricht process started. Compared to Greece, Spain and Portugal, most of the acces-Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement 61
sion countries belonging to the Luxembourg Round are performing better economically
in all areas (see Table 13). The procedures they have undertaken for EU accession and
integration, as well as a credible stability policy that complies with Maastricht criteria,
are likely to have positive effects on their most important financial indicators. The
Southern countries’ tremendous improvements in financial stability during the 1990s
clearly demonstrate the positive impact of joining the EMU.
Besides the economic criteria and technical requirements, such as embracing the Ac-
quis Communautaire, the candidate countries must join the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism II (ERM-II) at least two years prior to EMU accession. Candidate countries
must prove that their currencies are stable, meaning that their currencies need to hover
between plus or minus fifteen percent of a fixed parity established by the ECB in coop-
eration with their respective national banks. In fact, a currency board or a system of
fixed exchange rates towards the euro—as it now exists in such countries as Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria—does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient prepara-
tion for entering the EMU. When a country with a currency-board system wants to join
the ERM-II, its request has to be proofed by the EU. The central rate then will be based
on an agreement between the CEEC and EU authorities. Other CEECs seeking acces-
sion must prove that, in a system of floating exchange rates, their national currencies are
indeed stable, solid and credible in international currency markets. Any attempt to
weaken these criteria should be rejected by the ECB and the existing member states.
However, there are few experts in the CEECs who recommend the unilateral intro-
duction of the euro before their country fulfills the Maastricht Criteria or becomes a
member of the EU. From a technical standpoint, this “euroization” (like the “dollariza-
tion” of some Latin American countries) would mean that national currencies are re-
placed by the euro through fixing exchange rates irrevocably or replacing their national
currencies with euros. But any country taking this approach would give up its own
monetary policy and any “seignorage” gains—namely, incomes from the emission of
central-bank money. In addition, they would have no influence on the decisions of the
ECB.
There are several possible advantages to “euroization.” For one, those countries
whose national currencies are integrated into the EMU can expect immediate lower rates
of interest. Decreased costs of capital should promote domestic and foreign investments
and reduce interest payments on debt. Countries also can expect higher levels of eco-
nomic stability. Experience indicates that, over the long term, financial stability pro-
motes economic growth.
Nevertheless, there are dangers associated with entering the EMU prematurely. If a
CEEC enters before its financial system and industrial economy are mature enough to
orient economic policy toward Maastricht criteria, this could lead to an overly restrictive
monetary and fiscal policy that could fetter economic growth. We believe that a flexible
approach would be needed, an approach that is tailored to the economic situation of the
prospective country. For small, export-oriented countries such as Estonia, which is al-
ready operating with a currency-board system, a rapid adoption of the euro would be
preferable, provided that its financial sector is indeed solid. When exchange rates are no62 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
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-0.8 69.5 Three steps to Currency Union,
starting Jan. 1, 1999 fixed exchange
rate; Jan. 2002 introduction of the
euro as cash
CEEC-Luxembourg Group, 2001 (estimates)
2
Czech Rep. 5.3 4.8 -5.2 29.0 Managed Float (ref.: euro); Dev
9: 4.3%
Estonia 6.8 6.1 -0.8 6.1 Currency Board (ref.: euro); Dev
9: 0%
Hungary 6.9 9.6 -3.7 64.4 Crawling peg (ref. euro); Dev
9: -4.2%
Poland 9.0 6.0 -4.3 42.8 Float, (ref.: euro); Dev
9: -8.3%
Slovenia n.a. 8.6 -1.1 25.5 Managed Float (ref. euro); Dev
9: 7.4%
CEEC-Helsinki Group, 2001 (estimates)
2
Slovakia 7.7 7.6 -5.2 42.7 Managed Float (ref.: euro); Dev
9: 1.7%
Latvia 10.2 2.9 -2.2 10.2 Peg (ref.: currency basket); Dev
9: 4.2%
Lithuania 6.3 1.5 -1.4 25.0 Currency Board (ref.: euro);
Dev
9: 7.6%
Romania 49.2 35.0 -4.0 30.7 Managed Float (ref.: USD);
Dev
9: 38.6%
Bulgaria 5.0 7.7 -1.7 97.5 Currency Board (ref.: euro); Dev
9: 1.5%
EU-Southern Countries 1990/91
Portugal 16.8 12.4 -5.1 64.2 Float
Spain 14.7 6.5 -4.3 43.2 ERM
5
Italia 13.4 6.4 -11.0 97.3 ERM
5
Greece n.a. 15.6 -12.8 97.5 Float
Group Averages
Luxemb. 8.2 6.9 -3.1 34.4




8.1 4.0 -2.9 25.9
EU-South 15.0 10.2 -8.3 75.6
1 For the euro zone and if available for the CEECs, interest rates for ten-year state bonds; shorter maturities taken for Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. 
2 Inflation rate for consumer goods. 
3 Definitions might differ from those
of the EU. 
4 For the CEECs, deviation from the last three-year average exchange rate against the euro. 
5 EMS: European
Monetary System.
6  For interest rates, maximum of two percentage points above the best performers; for inflation, maximum
of 1.5 percentage points above the best performers; reference values during the euro introduction (beginning 1999). 
7 Refer-
ence values during autumn 2001. 
8 Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania. 
9 Dev: Deviation.
Sources: Osteuropa-Institut München (2001), DB-Research (2001), Gros (2000)Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement 63
longer flexible, all adjustments will be left to the “real” economy. In the case of weak-
ening competitiveness, wages have to adjust or high unemployment will occur. Addi-
tionally, fiscal policy has to be kept tight in order to avoid financial crises that would
end up damaging the economy as a whole. In fact, a rapid “euroization” would intensify
pressures for structural and institutional changes. The crisis in Argentina may serve as a
warning example for a premature fixed-exchange-rate system where reforms failed to
improve the flexibility of factor markets and the competitiveness of industries. Will
CEECs be able to cope with these challenges?
European monetary policy undoubtedly will become more complicated when the
CEECs integrate. This is because the structural differences and varying trade orienta-
tions between Western and Eastern Europe might cause different adjustment reactions in
their real economies. Adjustment reactions could include external shocks arising from
swings in oil prices, as well as instability stemming from external financial crises
(asymmetric shocks) that affect an EU member country. Because the EMU zone can
have only one monetary policy, no measures like exchange and interest rates will exist
to mitigate different and desired adjustments in the real economy of one or more mem-
ber countries. Since the euro is relatively weak against the US dollar, there has been (at
least until the writing of this working paper) no “hard test” of a single EMU member
state’s ability to adjust to an increase in competitive pressure from outside this monetary
zone.  However, sizeable currency-account deficits already have emerged—as large as
three to four percent of GDP in Spain and Greece and up to twelve percent in Portugal.
These deficits normally are financed within the framework of the EMU. Still, if they
turn out to be chronic and are the result of structural forces, they might, when combined
with a crisis in the financial sector, engender problems that spill over into the larger euro
zone.
We also need to consider that the existing member states of the EMU face potential
dangers when countries with large differences in economic development and structures
enter. As more and more countries with levels of per capita GDP well below the EU
average enter the EMU, the monetary-policy priorities of the European Central Bank
inevitably will become a source of conflict. We expect that some of the CEECs will
experience a “catching-up” process that results from higher rates of growth of factor
productivity, especially in the sectors involving tradeable goods. Different rates of pro-
ductivity growth in tradeable and nontradeable sectors well may contribute toward the
buildup of inflationary pressures (the so-called Samuelson-Balassa Effect). If this be the
case, an early entry of the CEECs into the EMU might cause an upward pressure on the
average level of prices, and hence induce at the very least a measurable rate of inflation
in the EMU zone.
With substantial differences in the causes of inflationary pressures and their mani-
festations in rates of inflation among EMU member countries, even an acceptably ade-
quate monetary policy is going to be extremely difficult to achieve. Since the composi-
tion of the ECB Council likely will change in favor of countries that are catching up
with the EU average, there might be additional dangers for the larger EMU member
states.  We expect to observe at least two possible reactions.64 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
First, if majority voting by the ECB Council takes on a more restrictive posture in the
face of higher overall inflation rates, this would decrease the rates of economic growth
in major EU countries. Secondly, if the ECB’s future board members orient themselves
more toward promoting short-term economic growth and an expansionary monetary
policy, the euro zone likely would suffer from a higher rate of inflation. Either way, a
consistent and fair monetary policy would be difficult to achieve. Additionally, an ECB
Council with members representing the twenty-five or even twenty-seven countries
making up the EU after Eastern enlargement scarcely would serve as an example of
streamlined management. The criteria for the formation of the ECB’s Board of Directors
should be reformed before Eastern enlargement proceeds much further (Baldwin et al.,
2000). A rotation of votes seems to be unavoidable. If the balance between the ECB
Board of Directors and the ECB Council is to be kept consistent, this inevitably implies
assigning relative weights to votes—a politically sensitive procedure. In addition, rules
for a country’s entry into the EMU should include evidence of progress toward conver-
gence.Preparing for the Eastern Enlargement 65
V. Conclusion: The Road Toward Agenda 2007
Eastern enlargement is a worthwhile project—an undertaking that is deserving of full
support by all current and aspiring EU members. History teaches us that since its start in
the 1950s the European Coal and Steel Community and the ensuing organizations lead-
ing up to today’s EU successfully have fostered economic integration. In turn, economic
integration has engendered a comparatively high level of prosperity, which now is
widely shared among the more than 300 million EU citizens. Such a broadly shared
prosperity has served as the foundation for Europe’s peace as well as its internal and
external security.  And these, in turn, will help to secure Europe’s economic prospects
for the long-term future.
Consequently, there are good reasons for yet-greater amounts of funds to be contrib-
uted by the existing member states. Further reforms nevertheless are needed to keep
costs under control and to ensure that an expanded EU remains operational with what
likely will include twenty-seven or even more member states by the second decade of
the twenty-first century. Reforms should improve the organization of EU institutions
and better its agricultural and structural policies. Improving the performance of the
European Central Bank also will be necessary to cope with the challenges of Eastern
enlargement.
Many problems would be solved if the EU were to make an institutional and organ-
izational shift away from its existing status toward something more on the order of a
federation of states. However, a united Europe cannot be built following an idealistic
blueprint, and no single European summit can be expected to bring a fundamental
breakthrough achieving the EU’s final form. We believe that the old method of modi-
fying the Union without any final design in mind (“Monnet’s proceeding”) should be
replaced by a dialogue regarding its finalité. Considering the fact that Eastern enlarge-
ment will endanger the operation of the Union, any partial solution to pressing problems
needs to fit a coherent concept. If this is not the case, the centrifugal forces of the Union
could cause it to spin apart, or to face a paralysis making it unworkable. But it remains
important to consider that European integration has been “path dependent” since it was
initiated in the wake of the destruction left by World War Two. The Union’s institu-
tional evolution has always involved and will continue to involve a step-by-step solution
of various problems, including those arising from Eastern enlargement (see Table 14 for
plausible scenarios toward Agenda 2007).
Our vision of a well-functioning Union with twenty-seven or more members is that
of a “Federation of European States” whose overriding paradigm should be subsidiarity,
solidarity and competition. Subsidiarity implies that the legislative and executive pow-
ers of the Union are strong and prevail in those areas where only EU institutions can
treat major policy questions effectively. With respect to economics and finance—which
are of major interest to us in this paper—the Union should improve its handling of legal
and competitive issues in the single market. Additionally, the EMU will require a close66 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
coordination of major economic-policy areas, especially in economic and fiscal policy.
Apart from some general regulations to ensure that agricultural markets function prop-
erly and that income-support measures are not distorting competition, agricultural and
rural policy should be shifted toward the administrative control of nations or even re-
gions. This also could hold for structural policy, which we believe should be concen-
trated on producing EU-wide public goods. Regional policy should be left to the com-
petence of single member states.
The second-mentioned principle, solidarity, comes into play when the Union pro-
motes the convergence of member states that are far behind the EU average in per capita
income. We recommend a newly designed “cohesion” fund, which would provide addi-
tional support to low-income EU member states with a consistent economic program.
This financial redistribution—as outlined above—should be limited and be based on
general guidelines (only investment expenditures) in order not to undermine the princi-
ple of competition, especially with respect to tax policy. In the long run—in the context
of a federation of European states—we recommend an automatic financial transfer sys-
tem. This system should be based on a clear and transparent mechanism that allows for a
fair distribution of funds according to the relative wealth of each nation.
With this “Federation of European States” as a goal, a number of major steps must be
made before 2007. The accession negotiations in the last quarter of 2001 and in 2002
not only should establish the terms of reference under which the new member states
enter the Union but also should determine how the old member states are affected by
enlargement. It would not be ideal if the entering CEECs were treated as second-class
members of the Union, although they will have to endure financial “transitional periods”
up to 2006. Hence we suggest that measures be taken to streamline EU policies and to
make them more effective and financially solid, thus allowing sufficient levels of funds
to be available as transfers to the CEECs. Can this be done?
We believe that a window of opportunity exists to make such changes before the end
of 2004, when the first CEECs are expected to enter. Negotiations on enlargement are
not affected by this time frame because accession countries must take over the Acquis
Communautaire before they enter, but it nevertheless is politically important to integrate
them already in the decision-making process. So, what are the steps ahead? After the
2002 elections scheduled to take place in many European countries, including France
and Germany, a realistic possibility exists that the EU’s mid-term review of agricultural
policy will engender major reforms. In this area, it is most important that a firm decision
be made and supported in order not to return to the “agricultural guideline”
20 but to stick
to smaller increases in the agricultural budget. WTO negotiations in succeeding years
will encourage further reforms (especially delinking direct payments from the means of
production), which then should allow the EU to incorporate CEECs under fair and equal
terms. With respect to structural policy, we recommend the adoption of a provisional
deal, based on the principle of “burden sharing.” Such a deal must be made—especially
                                                
20 The agricultural guideline determines the increase in the agricultural budget of 0.74 percent out of a
one-percent increase in the EU’s GDP. During the last years the increase was in fact limited to an increase
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with Spain—in order successfully to complete the accession negotiations by the end of
2002 or 2003.
However, net payers, especially Germany and Austria, can be expected to dig in their
diplomatic heels if they are forced to give up their priority of a rapid enlargement and
their demand for transitional periods with respect to their labor markets. Such transition
periods seem to be acceptable to all countries because they also were used at the time of
the Southern enlargement. In addition, accession countries are demanding transitional
periods for foreign citizens’ attempts to buy land in the CEECs, particularly in Poland,
land that largely has been closed to foreign purchase since the end of World War Two.
The next important step should take place at the intergovernmental conference (IGC)
planned for 2004. Already at the Laeken Summit in December 2001, member states
started to clarify their positions for the upcoming conference, agreeing on an ambitious
approach. The conference should address the core problems and determine the basic
competencies (decision-making power at the EU, national and regional levels) constitu-
tional issues (role of the EU-Parliament, EU-Commission and European Council) and
decision-making procedures of the EU. In fact, it should proceed to revise the Nice
Treaty. Majority voting could be decided more precisely when competencies are clari-
fied. In addition, the conference should serve as an opportunity to delegate responsibili-
ties for agricultural and structural policies to member states. The final outcome should
be a European Constitution.
It remains an open question whether EU member states will be willing to accept the
far-reaching changes that could be classified not so much as reforms but as a reconstitu-
tion of the European Union itself. However, it is promising that at the EU summit
meeting in Laeken European leaders decided to change the procedure for the intergov-
ernmental conference (IGC) in 2004. By creating a special constitutional convention to
meet from March 1, 2002 on, European governments may have changed forever the way
to launch EU reforms. This even could help the EU achieve greater support from its
population. The convention, headed by the former French prime minister Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, is made up of fifteen representatives of EU member states (one for each
state), thirty representatives of national parliaments (two for each country), sixteen rep-
resentatives of the EU parliament and one representative of the European Commission.
In addition, the accession countries will send their own representatives (following the
above formula), though these will not have a voice in the actual decision making until
their countries become full-fledged EU members. The convention approach may con-
stitute a substantial step forward in overcoming the "horse-trading” procedure of the
IGCs. However, final decisions on reforms will have to be made at an IGC.
We hope far-reaching reforms will be launched at the IGC in 2004—reforms that will
include the decision on a EU constitution. Nevertheless, we expect that details in major
policy areas will have to be negotiated later within the framework of a new Agenda
2007. The negotiations on this agenda likely will begin in 2005 and should be finished
in 2006. The agenda not only should address the financial perspective of the years 2007
to 2013 but also should propose a new design for EU policies. The outcomes of these
policy decisions will determine the EU’s financial plans from 2007 through 2013. If
there are any leftovers from the IGC 2004, Agenda 2007 should complete the process of68 Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper No. 240
introducing major reforms in EU institutions—reforms that should lead to more effi-
cient, transparent and legitimate decision making. We expect and hope that Agenda
2007 will serve as a major breakthrough for the future of a United Europe.
Reforms are needed not only because the EU is expanding to absorb the CEECs but
also because European economies are faced with the ever-growing challenge of global
competition. Successfully implementing effective reforms also will help convince the
citizens of Europe that fulfilling the high ideals of unifying Europe, as expressed in the
Treaty of Rome in 1957, is indeed a worthwhile project deserving of broad support.
TABLE 14
A Road Map to Agenda 2007
2001-2002 Negotiations over Eastern enlargement




Mid-term review of agricultural policy
End of 2002;
beginning of 2003
End of the negotiations over enlargement, important decisions on the
terms of entry for the first round of accession countries
2003 Checking of cohesion-funds criteria (Ireland probably will be ex-
cluded from funding)
2003 Intensive negotiations in the WTO round on agriculture and other
conflicting issues
2004 Intergovernmental conference on the European Union’s decision-
making structures
2004 or 2005 First accession countries enter the European Union
Our proposal: 2006 New intergovernmental conference: Agenda 2007, on the financial
perspective for the years 2007-2013 and further institutional and
policy reformsPreparing for the Eastern Enlargement 69
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